Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. II

THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE  AGAINST JAPAN (1)

POLICIES, MEASURES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR RESISTING THE JAPANESE INVASION (July 23, 1937)

1. Two Policies
2. Two Sets of Measures
3. Two Perspectives
4. Conclusion
   

FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL THE NATION'S FORCES FOR VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE (August 25, 1937)

COMBAT LIBERALISM (September 7, 1937)

URGENT TASKS FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION (September 29, 1937)

INTERVIEW WITH THE BRITISH JOURNALIST JAMES BERTRAM (October 25, 1937)

The Communist Party of China and the War of Resistance

The War Situation and Its Lessons

The Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance

Capitulationism in the War of Resistance

Democracy and the War of Resistance

THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AFTER THE FALL OF SHANGHAI AND TAIYUAN (November 12, 1937)

I. The Present Situation Is One of Transition from a War of Partial Resistance to a War of Total Resistance

II. Capitulationism Must Be Combated Both Inside the Party and Throughout the Country

Inside the Party, Oppose Class Capitulationism

In the Country as a Whole, Oppose National Capitulationism

The Relation Between Class Capitulationism and National Capitulationism

PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SHENSI-KANSU NINGSIA BORDER REGION AND THE REAR HEADQUARTERS OF EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY (May 15, 1938)

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN (May 1938)

Chapter I
Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War?

Chapter II
The Basic Principle of War Is to Preserve Oneself and Destroy the Enemy

Chapter III
Six Specific Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan

Chapter IV
Initiative, Flexibility and Planning in Conducting Offensives Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations

Chapter V
Co-ordination with Regular Warfare

Chapter VI
The Establishment of Base Areas

1. The Types of Base Areas
2. Guerrilla Zones and Base Areas
3. Conditions for Establishing Base Areas
4. The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas
5. Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle One Another

Chapter VII
The Strategic Defensive and the Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War

1. The Strategic Defensive in Guerrilla War
2. The Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War

Chapter VIII

Development of Guerrilla War into Mobile War

Chapter IX
The Relationship of Command

ON PROTRACTED WAR (May 1938)

Statement of the Problem

The Basis of the Problem

Refutation of the Theory of National Subjugation

Compromise or Resistance? Corruption or Progress?

The Theory of National Subjugation Is Wrong and the Theory of Quick Victory Is Likewise Wrong

Why a Protracted War?

The Three Stages of the Protracted War

A War of Jig-Saw Pattern

Fighting for Perpetual Peace

Man's Dynamic Role in War

War and Politics

Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance

The Object of War

Offence Within Defence, Quick Decisions Within a Protracted War, Exterior Lines Within Interior Lines

Initiative, Flexibility and Planning

Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and Positional Warfare

War of Attrition and War of Annihilation

The Possibilities of Exploiting the Enemy's Mistakes

The Question of Decisive Engagements in the Anti-Japanese War

The Army and the People Are the Foundation of Victory

Conclusions

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE NATIONAL WAR (October 1938)

Patriotism and Internationalism

Communists Should Set an Example in the National War

Unite the Whole Nation and Combat Enemy Agents in Its Midst

Expand the Communist Party and Prevent Infiltration by Enemy Agents

Maintain Both the United Front and the Independence of the Party

Consider the Situation as a Whole, Think in Terms of the Majority, and Work Together with Our Allies

Cadres Policy

Party Discipline

Party Democracy

Our Party Has Consolidated Itself and Grown Strong Through the Struggle on Two Fronts

The Present Struggle on Two Fronts

Study

Unity and Victory

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE AND INITIATIVE WITHIN THE UNITED FRONT (November 5, 1938)

Help and Concessions Should Be Positive, Not Negative

The Identity Between the National and the Class Struggle

"Everything Through the United Front" Is Wrong

PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY (November 6, 1938)

1. China's Characteristics and Revolutionary War
2. The War History of the Kuomintang
3. The War History of the Chinese Communist Party
4. Changes in the Party's Military Strategy in the Civil War and the National War
5. The Strategic Role of Guerrilla Warfare Against Japan
6. Pay Great Attention to the Study of Military Matters
   

THE MAY 4TH MOVEMENT (May 1939)

THE ORIENTATION OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT (May 4, 1939)

OPPOSE CAPITULATIONIST ACTIVITY (June 30, 1939)

THE REACTIONARIES MUST BE PUNISHED (August 1, 1939)

INTERVIEW WITH A NEW CHINA DAILY CORRESPONDENT ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (September 1, 1939)

INTERVIEW WITH THREE CORRESPONDENTS FROM THE CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, THE SAO TANG PAO AND THE HSIN MIN PAO (September 16, 1939)

THE IDENTITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ALL MANKIND (September 28, 1939)

INTRODUCING THE COMMUNIST (October 4, 1939)

THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE PARTY'S TASKS (October 10, 1939)

RECRUIT LARGE NUMBERS OF INTELLECTUALS (December 1, 1939)

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (December 1939)

Chapter I
Chinese Society

1. The Chinese Nation
2. The Old Feudal Society
3. Present-Day Colonial, Semi-Colonial and Semi-Feudal Society
   

Chapter II
The Chinese Revolution

1. The Revolutionary Movements in the Last Hundred Years
2. The Targets of the Chinese Revolution
3. The Tasks of the Chinese Revolution
4. The Motive Forces of the Chinese Revolution
5. The Character of the Chinese Revolution
6. The Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution
7. The Twofold Task of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party
   

STALIN, FRIEND OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE (December 20, 1939)

IN MEMORY OF NORMAN BETHUNE (December 21, 1939)

ON NEW DEMOCRACY (January 1940)

1. Whither China?
2. We Want to Build a New China
3. China's Historical Characteristics
4. The Chinese Revolution Is Part of the World Revolution
5. The Politics of New Democracy
6. The Economy of New Democracy
7. Refutation of Bourgeois Dictatorship
8. Refutation of "Left" Phrase-mongering
9. Refutation of the Die-hards
10. The Three People's Principles, Old and New
11. The Culture of New Democracy
12. The Historical Characteristics of China's Cultural Revolution
13. The Four Periods
14. Some Wrong Ideas About the Nature of Culture
15. A National, Scientific and Mass Culture

OVERCOME THE DANGER OF CAPITULATION AND STRIVE FOR A TURN FOR THE BETTER (January 28, 1940)

UNITE ALL ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND COMBAT THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS (February 1, 1940)

TEN DEMANDS ON THE KUOMINTANG (February 1, 1940)

INTRODUCING THE CHINESE WORKER (February 7, 1940)

WE MUST STRESS UNITY AND PROGRESS (February 10, 1940)

NEW-DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (February 20, 1940)

ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE BASE AREAS (March 6, 1940)

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF TACTICS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT (March 11, 1940)

FREELY EXPAND THE ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND RESIST THE ONSLAUGHTS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DIE-HARDS (May 4, 1940)

UNITY TO THE VERY END (July 1940)

ON POLICY (December 25, 1940)

ORDER AND STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN ANHWEI INCIDENT (January 1941)

Order of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Statement by the Spokesman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to a Correspondent of the Hsinhua News Agency

THE SITUATION AFTER THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT (March 18, 1941)

CONCLUSIONS ON THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT (May 8, 1941)