January 28, 1940
[This was an inner-Party directive written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.]
Current developments confirm the correctness of the Central Committee's appraisals. The line of capitulation taken by the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie runs sharply counter to the line of armed resistance taken by the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, and there is a struggle between the two. Both lines exist at present, and one or the other can win out in the future. What all our Party comrades must realize in this connection is that the serious cases of capitulation, anti-communism and retrogression which have occurred in various places should not be viewed in isolation. We should realize their seriousness, combat them resolutely and not be overwhelmed by their impact. If we lack this spirit and a correct policy for dealing firmly with these incidents, if we let the Kuomintang die-hards continue their "military and political restriction of the Communist Party" and are in constant dread at the thought of the break-up of the united front, then the War of Resistance will be jeopardized, capitulation and anti-communism will spread throughout the country, and there will be a real danger of the break-up of the united front. But it must be made abundantly clear that many objective conditions favourable to our struggle for continued resistance, unity and progress are still present both at home and abroad. For example, Japan's policy towards China remains as tough as ever; it is very difficult to rig up a Far Eastern Munich conference because there has been no real reconciliation between Japan on the one hand and Britain, the United States and France on the other despite some lessening of the contradictions between them, and because the British and French positions in the East have been weakened by the European war; and the Soviet Union is actively helping China. These are the international factors which render it difficult for the Kuomintang to capitulate or compromise, or to launch a nation-wide anti-Communist war. At home, the Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are firmly opposing capitulation and upholding the policy of resistance and unity; the intermediate classes, too, are against capitulation; and the capitulators and the die-hards within the Kuomintang, though in power, are numerically a minority. These are the domestic factors which render it difficult for the Kuomintang to capitulate or compromise, or to launch a nation-wide anti-Communist war. In these circumstances, our Party has a twofold task. On the one hand, it must resolutely resist the military and political offensives of the capitulators and die-hards. On the other, it must actively develop the united front of the political parties, the government organs, the armed forces, the civilian population and the intellectuals; it must do its utmost to win over the majority of the Kuomintang, the intermediate classes and sympathizers in the armies fighting Japan, to deepen the mass movement, to win over the intellectuals, to consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas, expand the anti-Japanese armed forces and the organs of anti-Japanese political power, and consolidate our Party and ensure its progress. If we do both these tasks simultaneously, we shall be able to overcome the danger of capitulation by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and to bring about a turn for the better in the whole situation. Therefore, the present general policy of the Party is to strive for a turn for the better and at the same time to be on guard against any emergencies (such emergencies, so far, being on a limited and local scale).
Now that Wang Ching-wei has announced his traitorous pact [1] and Chiang Kai-shek has published his message to the nation, it is beyond doubt that the agitation for peace will suffer a setback and that the forces favouring resistance will grow; on the other hand, the "military and political restriction of the Communist Party" will continue, there will be more local incidents, and the Kuomintang may stress so-called "unification against the foreign enemy" in order to attack us. The reason is that the forces supporting resistance and progress cannot build up enough strength in the immediate future to overwhelm the forces supporting capitulation and retrogression. Our policy is to spare no effort in extending the propaganda campaign against Wang Ching-wei's traitorous pact in all parts of the country having Communist Party organizations. In his message, Chiang Kai-shek states that he will carry on the War of Resistance, but he does not stress the need to strengthen national unity, nor does he mention any policy for persevering in resistance and progress, without which it would be impossible to persist in the war. Hence in the campaign against Wang Ching-wei we should stress the following points: (1) support the national policy of waging the War of Resistance to the very end and oppose Wang Ching-wei's traitorous pact; (2) the whole country must unite and overthrow the traitor Wang Ching-wei and his puppet central government; (3) support Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and crush Wang Ching-wei's anti-Communist policy; (4) down with the hidden traitors of the Wang Ching-wei brand, anti-communism being Wang Ching-wei's plot for splitting the anti-Japanese united front; (5) strengthen national unity and eliminate internal "friction"; (6) introduce political reforms, unfold the movement for constitutionalism and institute democracy; (7) lift the ban on political parties and grant legal status to anti-Japanese parties and groups; (8) guarantee the people freedom of speech and assembly in order to combat the Japanese and the traitors; (9) consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas and oppose the disruptive plots of the Wang Ching-wei brand of traitors; (10) support the troops who are fighting really well in the war and give adequate supplies to the fronts; and (11) promote cultural activities which help the cause of resistance, protect the progressive youth and proscribe all expression of collaborationist views. The above slogans should be widely publicized. Large numbers of articles, manifestoes, leaflets and pamphlets should be published and speeches delivered, and other slogans suitable to local circumstances should be added.
A mass rally to denounce Wang Ching-wei's traitorous pact is scheduled to be held on February 1 in Yenan. Together with the people of all circles and with the anti-Japanese members of the Kuomintang, we should organize similar mass rallies in all areas in the early part or the middle of February in order to create a nation-wide upsurge against capitulation, against the collaborators and against "friction".
NOTES
1. Wang Ching-wei signed a traitorous secret pact, called the "Programme for Readjusting Sino-Japanese Relations", with the Japanese aggressors at the end of 1939. According to its main provisions:
(1) Northeastern China was to be ceded to Japan and the "Mongolian Territory" (i.e., what was at that time Suiyuan, Chahar and northern Shansi), northern China, the lower Yangtse valley and the islands in southern China were to be marked off as "zones for close Sino-Japanese collaboration", that is, as zones permanently occupied by Japanese troops.(2) From its central government down to the local governments, the puppet regime was to be under the supervision of Japanese advisors and officials.
(3) The puppet troops and police were to be trained by Japanese military instructors and their equipment was to be supplied by Japan.
(4) The puppet government's fiscal and economic policies, its industrial and agricultural enterprises and its means of communication were to be controlled by Japan, and China's natural resources were to be freely exploited by Japan,
(5) All anti-Japanese activities were to be prohibited.
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