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BASIC TACTICS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
1937
1. HOW THE POPULAR MASSES CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTION.
How is it that the bare-handed masses, banded together in ill-armed military
units without guns or bullets, are able to charge the enemy, kill the enemy,
and resolutely carry out effective action in the war? This is a very widespread
and very reasonable query. But if we know the function of the weapons used
by an army and the aim of an army's action, we can then understand how our
popular masses, although bare-handed, still have weapons and can engage in
action to subdue the enemy.
The principal function of an army's weapons is simply to kill the enemy,
and an army's final aim is simply to reduce or destroy the enemy's fighting
strength. Well, in our daily life, is there any object that cannot be used
to kill the enemy or any type of action that cannot reduce or destroy his
fighting strength? For example, a kitchen knife, a wooden cudgel, an axe,
a hoe, a wooden stool, or a stone can all be used to kill people. Such actions
as cutting electric lines, destroying bridges, starting rumors, spreading
poison, or cutting off supplies can everywhere inconvenience the enemy or
reduce his fighting strength. All these are methods we may be unwilling to
utilize or unable to employ. If we really want to kill and exterminate the
enemy, there are weapons for us everywhere and work for us to be doing at
all times, in order to ensure effective united action by the army and the
people.
2. POINTS OF SPECIAL ATTENTION.
After from this, we must pay special attention to the present war on the
national level, which has become cruel beyond our imagination and has also
lasted a long time. We must not, because we are undergoing the suffering
of a war more cruel than any seen in the past, immediately capitulate; nor
must we, under the influence of a long war, suddenly lose our endurance and
give way to lassitude. We must inspire ourselves with the most resolute spirit
of unyielding struggle, with the most burning patriotic sentiments, and with
the will to endurance, and carry out a protracted struggle against the enemy.
We must know that, although the circumstances and the duration of the war
are cruel and protracted, this is nothing compared to what would happen if
the war were lost; if our country were destroyed and the whole of our people
reduced to a position of irretrievable ruin, the suffering would be even
more cruel and would never come to an end. Therefore, however cruel the war
may be, we must absolutely and firmly endure until the last five minutes
of struggle. This is especially the case with our present enemy, who finds
his advantage in a rapid decision in the war, whereas our advantage is to
be found in the strategy of a protracted war.
3. WE MUST NOT FEAR THE ENEMY.
When we see the enemy, simply because he has a weapon in his hands, we must
not be frightened to death like a rat who sees a cat. We must not be afraid
of approaching him or infiltrating into his midst in order to carry out sabotage.
We are men; our enemies are also men; we are all men, so what should we fear?
The fact that he has weapons? We can find a way to seize his weapons. All
we are afraid of is getting killed by the enemy. But when we undergo the
oppression of the enemy to such a point as this, how can any one still fear
death? And if we do not fear death, then what is there to fear about the
enemy? So when we see the enemy, whether he is many or few, we must act as
though he is bread that can satisfy our hunger, and immediately swallow him.
4. DEFINITION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE
When it is not advantageous for our main land army to meet the enemy in
large-scale engagements and we, therefore, 'send' out commando units or guerrilla
units, which employ the tactics of avoiding strength and striking at weakness,
of flitting about and having no fixed position, and of subduing the enemy
according to circumstances, and when we do not oppose the enemy according
to the ordinary rules of tactics, this is called employing guerrilla tactics.
CHAPTER II
TACTICS
At a time when our country's national defense preparation are not completed,
and when our weapons are inferior to the excellent equipment with which the
enemy has provided himself, we must observe the following principles whenever
we wish to wage a battle with the enemy:
1. PRECAUTIONS WHEN ON THE MARCH.
When we are on the march, we must send plainclothes units armed with pistols
ahead of our vanguard, behind our rear guard, and to the side of our lateral
defenses, in order to spy out the situation and to forestall unexpected attacks
by the enemy, or superfluous clashes.
2. PRECAUTIONS DURING HALTS.
When we encamp, if there is a presumption that the enemy may be near, we
should send every day a guerrilla companyor at least a platoontoward
the enemy's defenses to carry out reconnaissance at a distance (from 20 to
30 li ) or to join up with the local forces and carry out propaganda
among the masses, in order to inspire them to resist the enemy. If this unit
discovers the enemy, it should, on the one hand, resist him and, on the other
hand, report to us so that we can prepare to meet the foe or to retreat without
being drawn into an unnecessary battle.
3. WE MUST NOT ATTACK STRONG POSITIONS.
If the enemy guards his position firmly or defends a strong strategic point,
then, unless we have special guarantees of success. we must not attack
him. If we attack him, we will waste considerable time, and our losses in
killed and wounded will certainly be many times those of the enemy. Moreover,
in guerrilla warfare, our artillery is not strong: if we recklessly attack
a strong position, it will be very difficult to take it rapidly, at one stroke,
and, meanwhile, it will be easy for the enemy to gather his forces from all
sides and surround us. On this point, the army and the people must be absolutely
firm of purpose and cannot act recklessly in a disorderly fashion because
of a moment's anger.
4. DO NOT FIGHT HARD BATTLES.
If we do not have a 100 per cent guarantee of victory, we should not fight
a battle, for it is not worth while to kill 1,000 of the enemy and lose 800
killed among ourselves. Especially in guerrilla warfare such as we are waging,
it is difficult to replace men, horses, and ammunition; if we fight a battle
and lose many men, and horses, and much ammunition, this must be considered
a defeat for us.
5. WE MUST NOT FIGHT IF THE SITUATION OF THE ENEMY IS NOT CLEAR.
When we are encamped in a certain place and suddenly discover the enemy but
are not informed regarding his numbers or where he is coming from, we must
absolutely not fight, but must resolutely retreat several tens of
li. It is only if we are right up against the enemy that we
should send covering units, for, if the enemy comes to attack us, it is certainly
because his forces are superior or he has a plan, and we must under no
circumstances fall into his trap. If the enemy is in force, it is obviously
advantageous to retreat. If his numbers are small and we retreat, nothing
more than a little extra fatigue is involved, and there will always be time
to return and attack him again later.
6. WE MUST ORGANIZE THE MASSES AND UNITE WITH THEM.
Modern warfare is not a matter in which armies alone can determine victory
or defeat. Especially in guerrilla combat, we must rely on the force of the
popular masses, for it is only thus that we can have a guarantee of success.
The support of the masses offers us great advantages as regards transport,
assistance to wounded, intelligence, disruption of the enemy's position,
etc. At the same time, the enemy can be put into an isolated position, thus
further increasing our advantages. If, by misfortune, we are defeated, it
will also be possible to escape or to find concealment. Consequently, we
must not lightly give battle in places where the masses are not organized
and linked to us.
7. USING THE MASSES TO MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK AND BREAK A BLOCKADE.
When the enemy surrounds us and blockades us, we should rouse the popular
masses and cut the enemy's communications in all directions, so that he does
not know that our army is already near him. Then, we should take advantage
of a dark night or of the light of dawn to attack and disperse him.
8. SURPRISE ATTACKS ON ISOLATED UNITS.
When we have reconnoitered the enemy's position and have kept our men at
a distance of several li and when he has unquestionably relaxed his
precautions, then we advance rapidly with light equipment, before dawn when
the enemy does not expect us, and exterminate him.
9. USING THE POPULAR MASSES TO HARRY THE ENEMY.
On the basis of a decision by the main force of the army, in time of battle,
we send out part of our forces, divided into several unitsthe smallest
element being a platoonto lead the local militia, police, volunteer
army, or other popular masses of the peasantry and the workers. These groups
use a great variety of flags, occupy mountaintops or villages and market
towns, use brass gongs, spears, rudimentary cannon, swords and spikes, trumpets,
etc. They scatter all over the landscape and yell, thus distracting the enemy's
eyes and ears. Or, both night and day, on all sides, they shoot off isolated
shots to cause panic among the enemy soldiers and fatigue their spirit. Then,
afterward, our army appears in full strength when the enemy does not expect
it and disperses him by a flank attack.
10. CIRCLING AROUND TO GET AWAY FROM THE ENEMY.
When we are faced with a large enemy force and do not have sufficient strength
to meet its attack, we use the method of circling around. We hasten to a
place where there are no enemy troops, and we use mountain trails so that
the enemy cannot catch up with us. At the same time, along the way, we utilize
the popular masses, getting them to carry on reconnaissance work in the front
and the rear, so that we are not attacked, by the enemy from either direction.
11. GETTING OUT OF DIFFICULT SITUATIONS.
Presume that in the rear there is a pursuing army and in the front an obstacle,
or that the pursuing army is too strong for us. As a plan to get out of such
a difficult situation, we can send a part of our forces 4 or 5 li
off, to lure the enemy up a big road, while our main force follows a side
road and escapes the enemy. Or we can make a detour around to the enemy's
rear and attack him there by surprise. Or we can use the local militia and
the police to go along another route, leaving some objects, making footprints
in the road, sticking up notices etc., so as to induce the enemy to follow
them. Then, our main force suddenly rushes out from a side road, striking
at the enemy from the front and the rear, encircles him on all sides, and
annihilates him.
12. "CAUSE AN UPROAR IN THE EAST, STRIKE IN THE WEST."
When the army wants to attack a certain place, it does not advance there
directly but makes a detour by some other place and then changes its course
in the midst of its march, in order to attack and disperse the enemy. "The
thunderclap leaves no time to cover one's ears."
13. CONCEALED ATTACKS FROM AMBUSH.
When the enemy is pursuing us in great haste we select a spot for an ambush
and wait until he arrives. Thus, we can capture the enemy all at one stroke.
14. AMBUSHING THE ENEMY IN THE COURSE OF HIS MARCH.
When we learn from reconnaissance that the enemy plans to advance from a
certain point, we choose a spot where his path is narrow and passes through
confusing mountainous terrain and send a part of our troopsor a group
of sharpshooters to lie hidden on the mountains bordering his path,
or in the forest, to wait until his main force is passing through. Then we
throw rocks down on his men from the mountains and rake them with bullets,
or shoot from ambush at their commanding officers mounted on horseback.
15. MAKING A STRONG DEFENSE BY EMPTYING THE COUNTRYSIDE.
When our spies have informed us that the enemy is about to arrive, and if
our force is not sufficient to give battle, we should then carry out the
stratagem of "making a strong defense by emptying the countryside." We hide
the food, stores, fuel, grain, pots and other utensils, etc., in order to
cut off the enemy's food supply. Moreover, as regards the popular masses
of the area in question, with the exception of old men, women, and children,
who are left behind to provide reconnaissance information, we lead all
able-bodied men to hiding places. Thus, the enemy has no one to serve as
porters, guides, and scouts. At the same time, we send a few men to the enemy's
rear communication lines, to cut off his supplies, capture his couriers,
and cut or sabot age his communications facilities.
16. MEETING A SUPERIOR ENEMY.
(1) When the enemy advances, we retreat. If the enemy's forces were weaker
than ours, he would not dare advance and attack us. So, when he advances
toward us, we can conclude that the enemy is certainly coming with superior
force and is acting according to plan and with preparation. It is, therefore,
appropriate for us to evade his vanguard, by withdrawing beforehand. If we
meet with the enemy in the course of our march and either do not have clear
information regarding him or know that his army is stronger than ours, we
should, without the slightest hesitation, carry out a precautionary withdrawal.
As to the place to which we should withdraw, it is not appropriate to go
long distances the main roads, so that the enemy follows us to the end. We
should move about sinuously in the nearby area, winding around in circles.
If the enemy appears ahead of us, we should circle around to his rear, if
the enemy is on the mountains, we should descend into the valleys; if the
enemy is in the middle, we should retreat on the two sides ; if the enemy
in on the left bank of the river, we should retreat on the right bank ; if
the enemy is on the right bank, we should retreat on the left bank.
Moreover, in withdrawing, when we come to a crossroads, we can deliberately
leave some objects in the branch of the road we do not take or send a small
fraction of our men horses that way, in order to leave some tracks or write
symbols. Or we can write some distinguishing marks on the road we do take
to indicate that it is closed. Thus, we induce the enemy to direct his pursuit
and attack in the wrong direction.
At such times, it is best to evacuate the popular masses and such armed forces
as the militia, police, volunteer army, etc., by various routes in all
directions, in order to confuse the enemy's eyes and ears. We can leave behind
part of our men, who bury their uniforms and weapons and disguise themselves
as merchants, street vendors, etc. They spread rumors or pretend to be obliging
in order to spy out information regarding the enemy's numbers, his plans,
the location and routine of his camps, and the precautions he is taking.
If the enemy questions them about the direction in which we have withdrawn
and the strength of our force, they should talk incoherently, pointing to
the east and saying the west, pointing to the south and saying the north,
replacing big by small and small by big, talking at random and creating rumors.
They wait until our army is about to attack, and then they dig up their uniforms
and put them on, take out their weapons, and attack the enemy from his midst,
thus completely routing him and leaving him with nowhere to turn.
(2) When the enemy retreats, we pursue. When the enemy army retreats, it
is appropriate to take advantage of the situation to advance. On such an
occasion, the enemy's military situation must have undergone a change, otherwise
he would not have retreated, and he is certainly not prepared to join battle
against us with any resolution. If we take advantage of the situation and
make a covering attack on his rear, the enemy's covering units will certainly
not be resolved to fight, and in the context of the enemy's over-all plan
it will be difficult for his forward units to return and join in the fray.
In rough mountainous terrain, where the paths are narrow and rivers and streams
intertwined so that there are many bridges, even if the enemy's forward forces
were to turn back, this move would require much time. So, by the time he
turns back, his rear will already have been annihilated and he will already
have been disarmed.
At this time, the organizations of the popular masses, should devise methods
for destroying the bridges on the route over which the enemy is retreating,
or cutting the wires of his communications system. Or, best of all, they
should wait until the bulk of the enemy's army have retreated and, taking
advantage of the protection afforded by our guards and army, block the enemy's
path of retreat, so that, although his forces may want to turn back, they
cannot do it, and, although they yearn for help, they cannot obtain it.
But, at such a time, the most important task of the popular masses
is to spy out the direction in which the enemy is withdrawing, in order to
ascertain whether or not there may be an ambush or a feigned retreat intended
to encircle us from two sides, and report to us immediately so that our army
can pluck up courage and pursue the enemy or devise a method of evading
him.
(3) When the enemy halts, we harass him. When the enemy is newly arrived
in our territory, is not familiar with the terrain, does not understand the
local dialect, and is unable to gain any information from the scouts he send
out, it is as though he had entered a distant and inaccessible land. At such
a time, we should increase our harassmentshooting off guns everywhere,
to make him ill at ease day and night, so exercising a great influence on
both his mind and body under such circumstances, I fear that any army, however
overbearing, will begin to waver and will become weary. We need only await
the time when his spirits are wavering and his body weary, and then, if our
armies rush in all together, we can certainly exterminate him completely.
17. DEALING WITH A WEAK ENEMY.
Fighting as we are for the existence of our nation and the achievement of
the aims of guerrilla warfarewhich are to destroy the enemy and to
stir up the courage of the popular masses when we are faced with a
weak enemy, naturally we should unite with the popular masses of the place
in question to surround him and exterminate him at one stroke.
18. AROUSING THE MASSES.
There are always a good many among the popular masses who forget the great
cause for the sake of petty advantage. Frequently having received great favors
from the enemy, they act contrary to conscience and aid the forces of evil.
For this reason, before the arrival of the enemy in a given place, we must
do our utmost to whip up the spirits of the popular masses, to rouse their
will to resist and to endow them with an unshakable resolve to fight to the
end. without seeking advantage, without compromise or surrender. We must
induce them to follow our orders sincerely and to cooperate with our army
to resist the enemy. At the same time, we should also organize "resist-the-enemy
associations", "associations for national salvation", and other types of
professional bodies to facilitate the transmission of orders and the evacuation
of villages in time of necessity and to clean out traitors and prevent their
utilization by the enemy.
CHAPTER III
THE AIM OF THE WAR
The ultimate aim of guerrilla warfare is certainly to disarm the enemy, to
destroy his fighting strength, to get back the territories he has occupied
and to save our brethren whom he is trampling under foot! But when, because
of objective circumstances and other factors of various kinds, it is impossible
to attain this goal, it sometimes happens that the areas unaffected by the
fighting are controlled by the enemy in all tranquility. This should not
be. Because of this possibility, we must think up methods for inflicting
economic and political damage in these areas and destroying communication
facilities, so that, although the enemy has occupied our territory, it is
of no use to him and he decides to withdraw on his own initiative.
In guerrilla warfare, we must observe the principle "To gain territory is
no cause for joy, and to lose territory is no cause for sorrow." To lose
territory or cities is of no importance. The important thing is to think
up methods for destroying the enemy. If the enemy's effective strength is
undiminished, even if we take cities, we will be unable to hold them. Conversely,
when our own forces are insufficient, if we give up the cities, we still
have hope of regaining them. It is altogether improper to defend cities to
the utmost, for this merely leads to sacrificing our own effective strength.
CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZATION
1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ORGANIZATION.
(1) When we are devoting ourselves to warfare in an open region, it is the
sparsely populated areas, with a low cultural level, where communications
are difficult and facilities for transmitting correspondence are inadequate,
that are advantageous.
(2) Narrow mountainous regions, rising and falling terrain, or areas in the
vicinity of narrow roadsall of which are inconvenient for the movement
of large bodies of troops are also advantageous.
Opportunities also exist:
(3) When the people in the enemy's rear are in sympathy with our army.
(4) When the enemy is well-armed, and his troops numerous and courageous,
so that we have to evade direct clashes.
(5) When the enemy has penetrated deeply into our territory and we are preparing
everywhere to carry out measures of harassment and obstruction against him.
(6) Dense forests or reedy marshes, in the depths of which we can disappear,
are most advantageous for this purpose, especially in the late summer and
autumn, when we find ourselves behind a curtain of green.
2. FORMS OF ORGANIZATION.
The action of a guerrilla unit takes one of the following forms:
(1) We send out a large cavalry unit from our main force, together with mounted
artillery, or cavalry accompanied by a platoon or more armed with light automatic
weapons. They penetrate as rapidly as possible into the enemy's rear destroy
there all his communications links, and carry out the thorough and complete
destruction of all his storehouses of food, grain for his horses, and ammunition.
Moreover, they send out a small group of their forces to destroy all places
of military significance in the enemy's rear. Once these forays have been
carried out, the group fights its way out in another direction and rejoins
the main force.
(2) We send out cavalry or a special task group of infantry. Their strength
should be from a platoon to a few companies. They should penetrate as deeply
as possible into the enemy's rear and, moving rapidly and unpredictably,
should carry the battle from one place to another. When there is no alternative,
or when the enemy is not expected to arrive before a certain time, they can
also dwell temporarily in secret where they are. As required by the exigencies
of the situation, they can employ either all or a part of their forces. They
return when the time comes that they can no longer stay in the enemy's rear,
or when the task entrusted to them is completed, or because the enemy has
already discovered our traces and our intentions, and has taken effective
measures of defense.
(3) In the enemy's rear, we choose some young, strong, and courageous elements
among the local population and organize some small groups who will accept
the leadership of the experienced and trained persons we send out or of
experienced persons whom we had trained previously in the place in question.
The secret activity of these small groups involves moving from their own
area to another one, changing their uniforms, unit numbers, and external
appearance, and using every method so as to cover their tracks to the utmost.
(4) Or we seek volunteers from our army and provide them with high-quality
light weapons, in order to form them into special guerrilla units under the
leadership of such officers as have benefited from experience and study.
(5) Guerrilla units can be classified according to their nature. Those formed
of selected volunteers are called special guerrilla units. Those organized
generally from a part of our army are called basic guerrilla units. Those
organized from the local population are called local guerrilla units. When
basic and local guerrilla units engage in combined actions, they are subject
to the unified command of the commander of the basic unit.
(6) As for the choice of the members of a guerrilla unit, the members of
a basic guerrilla unit should be taken from among those soldiers who are
healthy, firm of purpose, patient, courageous, and quick-witted. Moreover,
the soldiers themselves be willing to join the group in question. In the
case of the independent actions carried out by these men in the course of
guerrilla operations, there is generally no way to verify whether or not
their tasks are executed in accordance with orders, and frequently they act
beyond the knowledge of the responsible commander. For this reason, the choice
and training of members of guerrilla units should have as its central theme
"faithfully carrying out one's task. "
(7) The choice and the nomination of the commander of a guerrilla task group
or small group requires even greater forethought and reflection. The capacity
of the commanders for faithful and courageous action, their military
knowledge-especially their knowledge of guerrilla tactics-their possession
of a lively intelligence and the ability to adapt rapidly to changing
circumstances, their loyalty, and their daring are indispensable conditions
for carrying out plans and completing our tasks.
3. NUMBER OF TROOPS
The number of men belonging to a guerrilla unit is determined by the tasks,
but it commonly ranges from five or ten men to something over a thousand.
However, the maximum strength of such a unit may not exceed one regiment.
If the number of soldiers is too large, the movements of our forces will
be encumbered, there will be greater difficulties regarding food supply,
and it will be difficult to conceal the troops by the use of false uniforms.
Because of these problems, our plans may be discovered or revealed before
they have been carried out. Moreover, replenishing our supplies of ammunition
will be a problem. Furthermore, we will often have difficulties because of
poor roads, with the result that not only will all our plans prove merely
illusory, but also we will often fall into difficulties to no good purpose
in going and returning.
The great superiority of a small guerrilla unit lies in its remarkable mobility.
With very little expenditure of time and effort, one can get food, and it
is also easy to find a place to rest, for one does not need much in the way
of rations or a place of shelter to camp. Still less is one held up by bad
roads, and supplies of ammunition and medicine are also easy to replenish.
If we do not succeed in our operation, we can retreat in good order.
4. TYPES OF SOLDIERS.
As for the type of soldiers employed in guerrilla units, cavalry, engineers,
and highly mobile infantry troops are excellent. Cavalry is entrusted with
the task of creating disorder on the enemy's flanks, and also, when we are
pursuing the enemy, with that of maintaining pressure on his rear guard and
creating confusion on his flanks and in his rear. Moreover, at all times,
cavalry is the guerrilla unit's only instrument for transmitting correspondence
and for reconnoitering. Hence, the cavalry is indispensable to any guerrilla
unit. Engineers are used for destroying communications in the enemy's rear
(such as railroads, telephone and telegraph lines, bridges, etc. ) As for
the highly mobile infantry units, they are useful to startle the enemy and
produce in him a feeling of insecurity night and day.
5. WEAPONS.
Apart from the rifles of the infantry and the cavalry, light machine guns,
hand grenades, etc., guerrilla units should also be supplied with pistols
and submachine guns.
To the extent that the terrain permits it, one can also add heavy machine
guns, mortars, and small cannons.
6. MEN AND BAGGAGE
Convenience of movement and agility being the characteristics of a guerrilla
unit, the baggage train, cases of equipment and ammunition, etc., should
all be kept as simple as possible for the sake of convenience. The combatant
and noncombatant members of the unit should all be organized as most appropriate
for guerrilla warfare, and all other persons who are not indispensable should
be kept to the strict minimum.
(1) The officers and men in each guerrilla squad should not exceed 8; each
platoon should not exceed 26; and each company should not exceed 100.
(2) When automatic weapons are somewhat more numerous, the number of men
can be still further reduced, and guerrilla units composed of 5 or 6 men
can be sent out repeatedly, in order to achieve the greatest results in terms
of harassing the enemy or securing intelligence.
(3) Each commanding officer of a unit should have only one orderly at most.
Apart from this according to the complexity of the tasks, two or three officers
should share the services of one orderly. Even more attention should be accorded
to not abusing this rule by unnecessarily increasing the number of couriers
as a substitute for orderlies and to seeing that an unnecessarily large number
of men are not sent to carry out a given task, thereby reducing the fighting
strength of one's own unit. Hence, when one sends out couriers, one must
reflect carefully on whether they can accomplish their task or not.
(4) It is preferable that each mass unit should not carry bundles of food.
When the dry rations carried separately by each soldier are exhausted, one
should take advantage of opportunities to borrow the pots and pans of the
population so as to prepare supplementary rations. If it is necessary to
carry bundles, each unit should not carry more than two.
(5) Bundles of writing materials should not be carried in excess of needs.
Normally, two bundles per regiment, one per battalion, and one per company
are permissible. The weight of each bundle should not exceed 40 kilograms.
(6) Each officer and soldier should carry his own bedding, knapsack, etc.
Bearers should not be engaged to transport these items. This rule should
be firmly established in advance.
7. OBJECTS TO BE CARRIED.
A guerrilla unit preferably should have the following things:
(1) Equipment and explosives for destroying railroads, telephone and telegraph
lines, arsenals, etc.
(2) Medicines. Those needed in case of emergencies should be carried according
to the season, but dressings, etc., should be provided on a permanent basis.
(3) A compass, and maps of the area in which the guerrilla unit operates.
(4) Light radio equipment, which is especially important in order to be able
to report at all times on the situation of the enemy and to listen in on
the enemy's reports.
(5) A certain quantity of gold coins, to provide for unexpected needs and
for buying food.
8. DISCIPLINE.
Whether or not the military discipline of a guerrilla unit is good influences
the reputation of our whole army and its ability to secure the sympathy and
support of the popular masses. Only strict discipline can assure the complete
victory of all our independent actions. Consequently, our attitude toward
those persons who violate military discipline, harm the people's interest,
and do not resolutely execute the orders of their superiors, should consist
in punishing them severely without the slightest regard for politeness. The
application of military discipline in a partisan unit does not aim exclusively
at punishment. Rather, it aims at strengthening the political instruction
of the officers and men and raising their level of political consciousness,
thereby indirectly eliminating a large number of actions contrary to military
discipline and causing the officers and soldiers to understand the psychology
of the masses, so that at appropriate times they can unite effectively with
the common people.
9. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.
(1) Each guerrilla task group and small group should have a political director,
and in the headquarters of the guerrilla unit there should be a political
training department, for directing the political work of officers and soldiers
and dealing with the human problems of all the political instructors.
(2) Each mess unit of a guerrilla unit should establish a special commissioner
in order to guard against the infiltration and activity of reactionary elements
and to encourage those soldiers without clear ideological consciousness who
are wavering in their purposes.
(3) In order to prevent desertion by the soldiers, a committee against desertion,
as well as "groups of ten," should be organized in each guerrilla unit. The
groups of ten and the committee against desertion are negative methods for
preventing desertion. Their organization and work should be carried out roughly
as follows:
-
In order to prevent desertion, every guerrilla unit should establish a desertion
committee and every mess unit should organize a group of ten.
-
The committee against desertion should be composed of from seven to nine
people, one of them being the chairman and the others members. It should
be composed of lower-level cadres who can endure difficulties and whose thinking
is friary, as well as heads of the groups of ten. The groups of ten are composed
of ten men in all, one of them being the head and the others members. They
are made up of faithful and reliable soldiers.
-
The over-all activity of the groups of ten is subordinated to the committee
against desertion. As regards military matters, it is subordinated to the
commander of the unit and to the committee against desertion. In other work,
it is subordinated to the political training department. Both groups of ten
and committees against desertion must accept the guidance of their commanding
officer.
-
The work of the group of ten should take account of all the actions and talk
of the officers and soldiers, especially of "camp idlers" and such. Unstable
elements should be secretly watched, even if they are members of the group
of ten or their friends.
-
Meetings should be held once a week to review the work and to report to the
commanding officer and the committee against desertion regarding the situation
in general at all times. After each extreme difficulty or when our army has
suffered a slight defeat and is staying in its base camp, special attention
should be paid to unfavourable attitudes that may develop among the soldiers
and to conversations that may endanger the morale of the soldiers.
-
The work of the committee against desertion consists above all in reviewing
the work of the groups of ten and in admonishing and guiding them at the
appropriate times. The committee may also call conferences of the heads of
all the groups of ten, or plenary conferences of all the members of the groups,
to discuss the progress of the work as a whole.
The soldiers' life is rather like living in the desert, and every day the
men undergo the fatigue of political study and training in the art of combat.
This may easily engender feelings of disgust and opposition. In order to
provide entertainment for the army and to compensate for a dull life, one
should establish in a guerrilla unit clubs or amusement rooms. (For details
of the organization and activities of such clubs, see the account in Chap.
XV, 10.)
10. SPECIAL FORMS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION.
(1) In order to make up for insufficient supplies of ammunition and poor
marksmanship, every company should have: from three to nine sharpshooters,
to be employed exclusively for shooting from ambush at long distances or
for shooting at special targets (enemy officers, machine-gunners or
artillery-men, couriers, etc. ) .
(2) The commander of each task group and small group should choose particularly
sharp-eyed couriers to serve as observes. Normally, a task group commander
should have two of these, and a small group commander one. These men serve
exclusively to remedy the insufficiency of battlefield observation.
(3) Each task group and small group of a guerrilla unit should have two nurses,
who devote themselves exclusively to emergency care of sick officers and
soldiers and to instruction in hygiene.
(4) In order to obtain reliable information regarding the enemy's disposition,
so as to be able to oppose him without losing any opportunities, all guerrilla
units should establish groups of scouts. Normally, it will be sufficient
if each unit has one platoon, each task group has one squad, and each small
group a smaller element. A network of local scouts should also be established
by the group of scouts wherever they go, or by scouts concealed in advance.
CHAPTER V
TASKS
The principal object of the action of a guerrilla unit lies in dealing the
enemy the strongest possible blows to his morale, and in creating disorder
and agitation in his rear, in drawing off his principal force to the flanks
or to the rear, in stopping or slowing down his operations, and ultimately
in dissipating his fighting strength so that the enemy's units are crushed
one by one and he is precipitated into a situation where, even by rapid and
deceptive actions, he can neither advance nor retreat.
-
Destroy railroads and highways within the area of action, as well as important
structures along the roads. Telephone lines and telegraph systems are especially
important.
-
Destroy the enemy's principal or secondary supply depots.
-
Destroy the enemy's storehouses of food and military equipment.
-
Strike in the enemy's rear, at his baggage train, or at his mounted and unmounted
couriers, as well as at his mounted scouts, etc. Also seize the provisions
and ammunition that the enemy is bringing up from the rear to the front.
-
Strike at the enemy's independent task groups and at the inhabited areas
that he has not yet solidly occupied.
-
Mobilize and organize the popular masses everywhere and aid them in their
own self-defense.
-
Destroy airfields and military depots of the air force in the enemy's rear.
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS
1. ACTION.
-
The first principle lies in careful and secret preparation, and in rapid
and sudden attack. Fierce wind and heavy rain offer a favorable occasion
for a guerrilla attack, as do thick fog, the darkness of night, or circumstances
in which it is possible to strike at an exhausted enemy.
-
The operations of a guerrilla unit should consist in offensive warfare. Whether
its numbers be great or small, such a unit can nonetheless appear where it
is not expected and, in its attacks, take advantage of the enemy's lack of
preparation. But when there are indications that the situation is unfavourable,
or when there is no certainty of victory, it is appropriate to withdraw rapidly,
so as not to suffer damaging losses. If the attack originally planned by
the guerrilla unit fails to give an advantageous result, and, the enemy goes
over to the offensive, a guerrilla unit should withdraw quickly. Only when
the enemy pursues us, and it is impossible to evade his attacks, can we fight
a defensive action and then gradually withdraw.
2. THE USE OF TACTICS.
-
The redoubtable force of a guerrilla unit definitely does not depend exclusively
on its own numerical strength, but on its use of sudden attacks and ambushes,
so as to "cause an uproar in the east and strike in the west," appearing
now here and now there, using false banners and making empty demonstrations,
propagating rumors about one's own strength, etc., in order to shatter the
enemy's morale and create in him a boundless terror. In addition, we must
pay attention to such principles as: "The enemy advances, we retreat, the
enemy retreats, we advance, the enemy halts, we harass him," camouflaged
attacks, etc.
-
A really excellent stratagem for bringing the enemy to his destruction lies
in mobilizing the popular masses, in making a strong defense by emptying
the countryside, in luring the enemy to penetrate our lines deeply, in cutting
his communications, in placing him in a position where he has difficulties
with his food supply, where his men are weary and the terrain is unfavorable
and then launching an attack.
-
By such tactics as sudden attacks, ambushes, making a strong defense by emptying
the countryside, etc., a guerrilla unit should make every effort to avoid
positional warfare, and all frontal engagements. Before the local guerrilla
units have received regular military training. they should not be launched
against the enemy in a regular and prolonged battle. For this reason, when
local guerrilla units are first formed, they should be used only in conjunction
with actions by basic or special guerrilla units. It is only after a certain
period that they can act independently.
-
If we strike at the point where the enemy feels the greatest difficulties,
in order to draw his main force to come to the relief of the position, then,
afterward, we send our main force somewhere else, either to attack other
isolated and weak forces of the enemy or to attack his reinforcements on
the march.
3. ADVANTAGEOUS AND DISADVANTAGEOUS TERRAIN.
-
Because open terrain affords very little good cover, it is slightly
disadvantageous for us when guerrilla units operate there. Covered, mountainous,
or broken terrain are advantageous for us.
-
A guerrilla unit should be thoroughly familiar with the terrain in its region
of action and should think frequently about the ways in which it can appear
from a place where the enemy army does not expect it, following secret and
hidden routes such as valleys, forests, or narrow winding paths, so as to
approach close to the enemy army and take advantage of a situation in which
the enemy, persuaded he is quite secure, has taken no measure of defence
whatsoever. Then, following the principle that the "thunderclap leaves no
time to cover one's ears," the unit can strike sudden blows and then vanish
into hiding without a trace, thus reducing the enemy to a level where he
does not feel secure whether he is withdrawing or advancing, attacking or
defending, moving or remaining still, sitting or lying down.
-
Relatively large villages, market towns, and places where there is a reasonably
large amount of grain and other moveable property are frequently the objects
of enemy attack and harassment. A guerrilla unit should regularly spy out
the enemy's traces, and prepare an ambush so as to attack him when he is
in the midst of his march.
-
A guerrilla unit should use every method, within its area of action, to prevent
the enemy's small units from entering. and his main force from concealing
itself there. In case of necessity, a guerrilla unit should also strive to
unmask the military strength, disposition, and plans of the enemy operating
outside its area of action.
4. SEASONS.
A guerrilla unit must consider the seasons (winter, summer, or autumn are
suitable for operations ), with reference to the strength of our forces and
those of the enemy, and especially with reference to the weapons of war;
it must also be thoroughly familiar with the organization of the enemy's
rear. Whether or not each season is favourable to us is also determined with
reference to the terrain.
5. SECRET ACTION
The peculiar quality of the operations of a guerrilla unit lies entirely
in taking the enemy by surprise. Consequently, we must take every possible
measure to preserve military secrecy, as described in detail below:
-
The commander of the unit should explain to his subordinates their tasks
and the plan for the operation only just before the action begins, or while
they are advancing. In case of necessity, he should explain the whole plan
only by stages, so that others learn about each stage only when required.
-
The best method for the transmission of orders in a guerrilla unit is by
oral explanations from the commander to his subordinates. It is necessary
to limit written orders insofar as possible, in order to avoid leakage of
military secrets.
-
One should not discuss the whole of one's actions and plans with guides or
the local population. This is the case even with regard to local populations
favourable to us; it is even more necessary to forbid such talk when we are
about to attack a certain place.
-
We should send out faithful and reliable scouts in advance to observe the
point where we are going to camp or to lie in ambush along important roads
in the enemy's rear, in order to cut off his information.
-
When we advance, our rear guard should take full responsibility for obliterating
and removing all secret signals and road signs. We should also advance by
circuitous route, so that the enemy does not know the direction of our advance.
-
Fixed code names should be used in place of all unit designations, and the
use of the real names of units should be strictly prohibited.
-
Except in case of necessity, all documents should be burned immediately after
they have been read.
-
Apart from the methods already enumerated, the true plans of a guerrilla
unit can also be obscured in certain cases by using the local population
for the deliberate propagation of false information about the operations
of the guerrilla unit, in order to deceive the enemy.
6. ARRANGEMENTS AND PREPARATIONS FOR MOVEMENT.
In order that our movements may be rapid, apart from doing our utmost to
simplify all our organization, we should at all times maintain excellent
preparations for action (investigation and intelligence regarding the front,
care of sick soldiers, preparation for guides, preferably employing local
peasants whose sympathies lie with the guerrillas, or other reliable persons),
and we should also preferably carry three days' dry rations. If this is done,
then when we want to move, we move, and when we want to stop, we stop, and
there is no need for special arrangements.
7. THE CONDITIONS FOR VICTORY.
-
A condition for the victory of a guerrilla unit is that the officers and
soldiers have an absolutely courageous and resolute spirit. They must also
be filled with a spirit of action in common, and be thoroughly alert and
resolved to carry out their own tasks. Apart from this, they must have healthy
bodies and be able to endure boundless hardships, be good at the use of their
weapons, etc.
-
A guerrilla unit should not lose heart in difficult times, nor should it
cease its activity if it encounters difficult circumstances. As regards their
confidence in ultimate victory, their confidence in the success of their
cause, and especially their hatred of our national enemy, such circumstances
should only strengthen their purpose to advance courageously in spite of
all obstacles.
8. UNITED ACTIONS.
If a small guerrilla unit, because its numbers are insufficient, cannot carry
out a task assigned to it, it can unite temporarily with a few other guerrilla
units, in order to fulfill its task.
Guerrilla operations are best carried out under cover of night.
CHAPTER VII
SURPRISE ATTACKS
1. POINTS THAT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED REGARDING OUR TASKS BEFORE
A SURPRISE ATTACK.
When a guerrilla unit has finished concentrating for an attack, and when
plans for scouts, courier service etc., have all been satisfactorily completed,
and one is preparing a surprise attack on a certain inhabited place, the
commander of the guerrilla unit must first form a clear idea about each of
the following points.
-
What is the strength of the military forces defending the given inhabited
place? How are they deployed? How are they armed? What is their fighting
capacity? How many scouts to sound a warning have they sent out?
-
Is there any other enemy nearby? If there is, how far away is he? Can he
quickly come to the aid of the defending forces? Can we imagine how he would
come to aid them? From what direction he would come?
-
What sort of roads are there that could be followed by the guerrillas and
by the enemy? What hidden roads are there in the vicinity of the place we
intend to attack by surprise? What route will we take to get to the place
we are attacking? The preceding three points are not only things we should
know in view of carrying out a surprise attack; we must also not fail to
consider them with reference to our withdrawal after the attack.
-
As for fixing the time of a surprise attack, it is best to carry it out at
night, for, under the cover of darkness, even if the attack should fail,
it can still inspire panic in the enemy. But we can attack at night only
if we are thoroughly familiar with the terrain, and have clearly understood
the enemy's dispositions or have extremely good guides. Otherwise, we should
choose instead to carry out such surprise attacks at daybreak. If a surprise
attack is to be directed against a supply depot, it should be carried out
in the dead of night, for the men, horses, and military equipment in such
a depot will be on the move again very early, at daybreak.
-
Can the population of the given inhabited place aid the enemy or not? How
can we prevent the population from bringing trouble on itself in this way?
While we should think through our plans at length, we should avoid
overly subtle plans.
2. POINTS FOR ATTENTION BEFORE SETTING OUT.
-
Before setting out, a guerrilla unit should complete all its preparations
for the march (see below). Moreover, it should consider taking stretchers
for transporting wounded soldiers.
-
The method for a surprise attack on the enemy should be thoroughly understood
beforehand not only by the commander of the unit and the commanders of each
task group, but also by all the members of each independent task group. The
best mode of transmitting this information is through oral explanations by
the commander and his staff. Written orders of all kinds should be held to
a minimum, in order to avoid having their contents divulged by loss or mistake.
-
Prior to setting out, all officers at every level should appoint a replacement,
in order, on the one hand to express their resolution to sacrifice themselves
and, on the other hand, to avoid the risk that, if they are wounded or killed,
the action of the guerrilla unit may fail to attain its objective because
of them, thus influencing the whole situation.
3. POINTS FOR ATTENTION WHILE ON THE MOVE.
-
We must make the greatest efforts to conceal the movements of a guerrilla
unit and to prevent discovery by the enemy. Consequently, while advancing,
we must leave the highroads and avoid large villages, and choose out-of-the-way
places or even places where there are no roads at all, advancing along narrow
winding trails. But we should keep away from miry roads, so as to avoid excessive
fatigue.
-
When advancing, we should not proceed for long time on the same road, for
this makes it easy for the enemy to discover our tracks. From the standpoint
of keeping our movements secret, it is also generally appropriate to move
by night, even when we are advancing a long distance.
-
When we are advancing, for the sake of concealing ourselves, we should hold
the number of people we send out for reconnaissance to the very lowest level.
In general, it will be sufficient to send just a few scouts along the road,
but we must have very good guides.
-
If we are not absolutely certain that there are no enemy spies coming to
observe us, it is best to divide our forces into small groups, which advance
separately in different directions and then concentrate at a point which
has been secretly designated.
-
When a guerrilla unit is on the move, it should be constantly prepared for
a meeting with the enemy. For this reason, the commanding officer of a guerrilla
unit generally advances, accompanied by his staff, just behind the scouts,
behind the elite soldiers, or ahead of the staff of the unit (the staff is
entrusted to the leadership of the second in command). Thus, it is easy to
obtain a clear picture of the situation, and decisions can be taken very
rapidly. If the commander sees that it is possible to advance, he advances;
if he becomes aware of difficulties, he withdraws. All that is required is
for two or three officers to hold a discussion, and then the decision can
be made. Thus, we avoid sending orders back and forth, with the consequent
wasting of opportunities, and we diminish command form the rear, and its
attendant evil of taking action not in keeping with the circumstances.
-
Apart from the scouts sent out along the road, the soldiers of the guerrilla
unit should not load their rifles, so as to avoid accidental discharges during
the march and discovery by the enemy.
4. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IF THE ENEMY IS ENCOUNTERED WHILE ON THE MARCH.
-
Under no circumstances should a guerrilla unit provoke a pointless battle
before it has reached its objective. Even though a guerrilla unit may encounter
the enemy in the course of its march, it should devise a way for getting
around himif necessary, departing from the original plan. If there
is no way of avoiding battle, we should emerge from ambush, after rapid
preparations, so as to appear where the enemy does not expect us and annihilate
him by a surprise attack. At the same time, when we are carrying out such
a maneuver, we should pay attention to whether the enemy halts or advances,
and send out scouts to reconnoiter from all directions. If the enemy army
is not prepared for battle or if, although he is in some strength, he is
not on the alert, we should charge him immediately. Otherwise, we should
remain in hiding and quietly await an opportunity.
-
When, in the course of our march, we encounter enemy outposts or scouts,
we should avoid being seen by them and circle past them in strict silence.
But it we encounter a situation in which we judge there is an opportunity
to be grasped, we should act rapidly and capture them without firing a shot.
5. DISPOSITION OF TROOPS DURING A SURPRISE ATTACK.
When a guerrilla unit carries out a surprise attack, the disposition of its
troops should be more or less as follows:
-
We should launch a fierce attack by our main force on the point in the enemy's
disposition where it hurts the most a really swift and resolute sudden
blow. We should also send another force around to carry out energetic action
on the enemy's flanks and in his rear, in order to confuse his judgement,
and prevent him from fathoming where our main force is located.
-
We should attack one point in the enemy's disposition with all our might,
but we should also carry out feigned deployments in other places and make
an empty demonstration with a few scattered soldiers, so as to confuse the
enemy's eyes and ears, and disperse his forces.
-
If we can determine beforehand the enemy's line of retreat, then we should,
within the limits of what is possible, send a part of our forces to intercept
him. Ii the enemy has his heavy artillery and logistic supply installed outside
the village, then we should designate a special small group to seize them.
-
If the guerrilla unit is numerically strong, it should be divided into several
columns and should carry out the attack from two, three, or several directions,
attempting to cut off the enemy's retreat, But we should consider the matter
thoroughly, so as to avoid causing confusion in our own ranks, which might
result in erroneously taking our own troops for those of the enemy. Because
of this possibility, it is necessary, in advance of the action, to agree
on signals.
-
In the case of a surprise attack on the enemy, if there is reason to fear
that enemy reinforcements may arrive from a certain direction, we should
send a small body of troops in advance of the action to the route where the
reinforcements may arrive, so as to obstruct their advance, or report this
peril to the main force.
-
At the time of a surprise attack, the choice of the point on which the brunt
of the attack will fall, and the geographical distribution of our forces
(in general, two-thirds of our men are used for the principal direction of
attack, and only one-third for the auxiliary directions of attack) must
absolutely be such as to prevent the enemy forces from spreading out or receiving
reinforcements and to make it possible for us to smash them one by one.
-
The various task groups making up a guerrilla unit should divide their forces
within a very short distance of the point where the attack is to be made,
and from there make a separate but coordinated advance. The best place for
this is the point from which the charge will be made. In this way, we can
avoid such misfortunes as losing our way, or the premature division of our
forces, and we can also. guard against the danger of surprise attacks by
the enemy. For the farther apart are the various independent columns or groups,
the more likely they are to be separated by the terrain, and the more difficult
it will be to expect them all to strike at the same moment.
6. THE SUCCESS OF A SURPRISE ATTACK.
In general, we charge the enemy when he is not prepared, in circumstances
where he is frightened and flustered. If we really want to strike when the
enemy is not expecting us and attain success, the following points should
be attended to:
-
We must act rapidly and secretly and not allow our plans to be revealed
prematurely.
-
We must strike at a time when the enemy's warning system is not very alert.
-
We must make an empty display, and attack in several places at once, so that
the enemy's reaction is confused, his forces are frightened and hamper one
another, and he cannot use all his strength to resist us stubbornly.
-
In carrying out the surprise attack, we must attack at the appointed hours;
there must be no noise; no shots must be fired; there must be no battle cries.
We must make every soldier understand the use of the arms employed in a surprise
attack, which are the bayonet and the hand grenade. We must not return fire
simply because we hear the gunfire of the enemy. It is only when we have
an opportunity to take advantage of the situation to attack the enemy that
we should launch our attack, with our vanguard well supported by our rear
guard, choosing frontal, flanking, or direct blows.
7. DISPOSITIONS FOLLOWING THE SUCCESS OF A SURPRISE ATTACK.
-
As soon as the tasks of a surprise attack have been carried out, a guerrilla
unit should rapidly withdraw. Before withdrawing, it is best to go a few
li in a false direction, and then afterward turn and go in
our true direction, so that the enemy will be unable to discover our tracks,
and will not be able to follow us.
-
It is not appropriate for a guerrilla unit to take along prisoners, or to
acquire large amounts of booty, which hinder our movement. It is best to
require the prisoners first to hand over their weapons, and then to disperse
them or to execute them. As for booty, it should be dispatched by the local
government, or by the population.
-
During the battle, three officers and men out of every company should be
given the exclusive task of picking up and gathering together abandoned rifles
and ammunition. After a victorious battle, we should devote all our efforts
to collecting everything on the battlefield, and we can also call upon the
population of nearby areas to gather such things together, so that not the
smallest trifle is left behind.
8. DISPOSITIONS FOLLOWING THE DEFEAT OF A SURPRISE ATTACK.
If a surprise attack is defeated, we should rapidly withdraw to the place
of assembly designated in advance. The usual assembly point is in the place
where we encamped the previous night. If our forces are sufficient, we can
leave a reserve unit along the designated withdrawal route, to look out for
prisoners and wounded men.
CHAPTER VIII
ESPIONAGE
1. POINTS FOR ATTENTION WHEN CARRYING OUT ESPIONAGE.
-
All reports on the situation should be transmitted without loss of time to
one's superiors or to friendly armies.
-
The reports which we collect absolutely must be in full detail. All sloppy
and negligent reporting must be severely prohibited.
-
The scope of espionage is not limited merely to the situation of the enemy;
spies should also pay attention to the terrain. We should be informed of
all aspects of the terrain that are disadvantageous to us, especially those
aspects favourable to the enemy, such as narrow roads, river crossings,
circuitous routes for avoiding these river crossings and narrow roads, etc.
-
We should bend every effort to obtain complete and detailed information regarding
all matters having any relation to our guerrilla unit; our efforts should
never cease until we understand the situation thoroughly.
-
We should pay attention to the sentiments of the people toward ourselves
and the enemy. Are the people actively aiding us? How is their positive attitude
manifested?
2. METHODS OF ESPIONAGE.
Apart from sending out courageous and intelligent individuals (i.e., spies)
to carry out espionage on every hand, a guerrilla unit must unite closely
with the popular masses of the place in question. Moreover, in strategically
important places, we use reliable local inhabitants or those among the people
who sympathize with the guerrilla unit (for example, we can make use of feudal
relationships and find a relative, or someone belonging to the family of
person who has been executed by the enemy; we can also employ those among
the people who hate the enemy, etc. ). We give these people a relatively
good salary, establish a secret espionage network, as well as a system of
sentries, so that we can transmit information with facility.
3. ESPIONAGE REGARDING THE NUMBER OF THE ENEMY'S TROOPS, HIS TACTICAL SKILL,
AND HIS ARMAMENT.
-
Where are so and so many enemy infantrymen, cavalrymen, artillery-men, and
other units to be found? How many armored cars and trains, tanks and air
planes does the enemy have? And where are they?
-
What kind of defensive works does the enemy have in his front, in his rear,
and around his cities and other places? What kind of forces are defending?
-
Where are the enemy's encampments and arsenals?
-
What about the enemy's reserves and flanking troops? Where are they?
-
How is the morale of the enemy soldiers? Are they prepared to fight or not?
What are their relations with the people and with their own officers?
-
What about the enemy army's supplies of military equipment, bedding and clothes,
food, and other items?
4. ESPIONAGE REGARDING THE TERRAIN.
-
First of all, we must pay attention to the important roads within this area,
as well as their direction, their width, their type of surface, whether or
not they are muddy, etc., and whether or not they are suitable for use by
all types of forces.
-
Are there any forests or not? If there are, we must pay attention to the
kinds of trees, and to their area.
-
We must consider rivers, their width and depth, their rate of flow, the slope
and type of soil of the banks. Are there bridges, ferries, or other means
for crossing the river? If there are bridges, will they bear up under artillery,
the baggage train, and other types of unit?
-
Are there any marshes? Where? What is their area? Can they be crossed or
not? If so, we must note what kinds of troops can get through them.
CHAPTER IX
AMBUSHES
1. TYPES OF AMBUSH.
When we emerge suddenly from hiding, and strike a sudden blow at the enemy
who is just passing by, this is called an ambush. The sole habitual tactic
of a guerrilla unit is the ambush. By means of an ambush it is extremely
easy to obtain a good result, and as a general rule they are always advantageous.
Such action is divided into the following types:
-
Ambush by luring the enemy. This occurs when our troops, so to speak, prostrate
themselves and hold out both arms, enticing the enemy to penetrate deeply.
It is carried out by first placing our main force in ambush along the two
sides of the road, or in a hiding place on one side, and then attacking the
enemy with a small force. This force then feigns defeat and withdraws, luring
the enemy deep into our lines, after which the main force rushes out from
one side or both sides and carries out a surprise attack.
-
Waiting ambushes. These are very similar to ambushes by luring the enemy,
but it is not necessary for a part of our forces to feign defeat. Instead,
we establish an observation post on some height, to observe the movements
of the enemy army, and when his main force has reached the appropriate point,
we rush out and attack him by surprise.
2. SPOTS FOR CARRYING OUT AMBUSHES, AND OBJECTIVES TO BE ATTACKED.
Ambushes can be carried out against a variety of objectives such as isolated
enemy soldiers, couriers, whole mobile units, logistic convoys, transport
columns, trains, etc. Further details are given below.
-
When ambushing the enemy's cavalry or infantry, we should choose a spot where
they cannot use their weapons and where it is not easy for them to manifest
their full strength.
-
Ambushes against logistic convoys or transport columns should be carried
out in the midst of a forest or in the countryside.
-
Ambushes of small enemy units, or whole mobile units or motorized transport
columns are most valuable. But we must first understand their plans, the
direction in which they are advancing, and the time it will take them to
pass. We must also reflect in detail on the location for the ambush and carefully
seek out a place likely to contribute to a favourable result. At the same
time, we must carefully select in advance the route for our own withdrawal.
-
When a guerrilla unit carries out an ambush against a railroad train, our
forces can be split into three parts. The first part should take up battle
positions near the railroad, to guard against resistance from the train.
The second part should take up a position on the two sides of the train,
and shoot into the carriage. The third part has the task of charging and
boarding the train to make a search, unloading the cargo, taking charge of
the weapons, etc .
3. THE TERRAIN IN AMBUSHES.
The point at which an ambush is carried out must have the following features:
-
It must have good cover, in order to prevent our being observed by the enemy
and, at the same time, permit us to observe the enemy.
-
It must permit us to employ our maximum fire power.
-
It must allow us to leap out rapidly at one bound from ambush and come to
grips with the enemy. Hence, between the point where we lie in ambush and
the enemy, there should be a dense forest, a damp depression, a narrow road,
or some other intervening ground.
4. THE DISTANCE FROM WHICH AN AMBUSH SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT.
If the guerrilla unit which carries out a surprise attack is in sufficient
strength so that it wants to come to grips with the enemy at one bound, then
it should stage its ambush near the side of the road. If, on the other hand,
the enemy is in considerable strength, and our plan is merely to harass him
and cause confusion, then we should remain in a place some distance from
the road.
5. IMPORTANT TRICKS FOR AN AMBUSH.
-
An ambush can most advantageously be carried out in silence. Whether by day
or night, loud talking should be absolutely forbidden, as should patrolling
along the front.
-
Remaining a long time in ambush can easily lead to discovery of our plans
and an increase in the danger. Because of remaining too long in ambush, the
state of tension of our men is gradually weakened, and they can no longer
maintain their vigilance. Hence, one can easily be discovered by the enemy.
A point that especially merits attention is that, if we have already been
discovered by the enemy, we should immediately either launch our attack or
withdraw.
CHAPTER X
SURPRISE ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY'S FORAGING UNITS
1. OCCASIONS FOR SURPRISE ATTACKS.
A charge against the enemy's foraging units should be carried out under the
following circumstances:
-
It can be executed when the enemy unit is nearing a village.
-
We can wait until the enemy enters a village and has scattered in all directions
to forage from door to door, and then carry it out.
-
We can wait until the enemy has finished foraging and is returning loaded
with booty, and then attack by surprise from ambush.
-
Which of the above types of attack is most appropriate should be determined
with reference to the circumstances, by the persons who are responsible for
the guerrilla unit. They should carefully evaluate all the factors and make
arrangements adapted to circumstances.
2. SURPRISE ATTACKS IN A VILLAGE.
It is most advantageous to attack the enemy's foraging units in a village.
At such a time the greater part of the enemy's foraging unit is scattered
all over the place, and it is not easy for them to gather together quickly.
But, in carrying out this type of surprise attack we must steal by the enemy's
warning outposts or capture his sentinels without the slightest sound; only
then can we make our attack.
3. SURPRISE ATTACKS OUTSIDE A VILLAGE.
It the force carrying out a surprise attack is especially weak, it must wait
until the foraging is completed and until the foraging column has reached
a place favourable to a surprise attack such as when it is passing
through a forest, across a bridge, or along a narrow roadbefore attacking.
4. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SURPRISE ATTACK.
When a guerrilla unit has attacked and dispersed the enemy unit covering
a foraging operation, it can reckon only that it has completed part of its
attack. It must also destroy or capture all of their wagons. Consequently,
the guerrilla unit should first engage the enemy covering unit in combat
and then attack the logistic convoy with its main force and capture it.
5. POINTS TO WHICH THE GUERRILLA UNIT SHOULD PAY ATTENTION.
It is easy to obtain the assistance of the local population when attacking
one of the enemy's foraging units. Hence, within the limits of what is possible,
part of the property seized should be given to the popular masses, to heighten
their courage.
CHAPTER XI
SURPRISE ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORT UNITS
An attack on a transport column is one of the most advantageous forms of
action for a guerrilla unit, since we can obtain in this manner the weapons,
food, and supplies we need.
1. SUDDEN SURPRISE ATTACKS.
With such attacks, we can frighten the enemy out of his wits, and precipitate
him into a state of complete confusion. The coolies of the transport units
are, in large part, timid peasants forcibly impressed. Moreover, the size
of the covering force is limited, and it is generally spread out over a very
long distance. If we overturn one of the wagons, we can make all the wagons
behind it stop too.
2. METHODS OF ATTACK.
-
The guerrilla unit must not forget that its task is not to defeat the enemy,
but to capture the enemy's wagons. Consequently, we should detail only a
part of our forces to do battle with the enemy's covering unit. The rest
of our men should be ordered to plunder, pursue, and demolish the materials
he is transporting. Hence, whenever we carry out such a surprise attack,
we should do our best to contrive matters so as to open fire rapidly against
the transport unit and cause them to stop, in order to increase their confusion
and fear.
-
In order to stop the whole transport column, it is only necessary to shoot
at the front part of it, because, under conditions of mass anxiety and
bewilderment, when the wagons in front stop, they will interfere with one
another, fall over on the side of the road, and bring about a situation of
extreme confusion. If there are a large number of transport wagons, and if,
because the front of the column is under fire, the wagons at the rear endeavor
to turn around and escape, the guerrilla unit should send out a small number
of riflemen to shoot furiously from cover at the tail end of the column,
so that it does not dare turn around.
-
If the unit carrying out the surprise attack is in an inferior position,
and the covering unit is taking active precautionary measures, the guerrilla
unit should exhaust the enemy by incessant false alarms, and then when the
transport column is passing through a forest or valley or along a narrow
road in some other type of terrain, where the enemy's logistic convoy cannot
easily turn around, the attack should be swiftly carried out.
It is not often advantageous to carry out a surprise attack on a baggage
train in a village, for the covering unit and the logistic convoy can easily
make use of the houses and other cover, and offer strong resistance.
-
If the covering unit has already been dispersed by our attack, the resistance
of the transport unit has also been overcome, and enemy reinforcements cannot
arrive in time, the guerrilla unit can then destroy the wagons and the goods
they are carrying or destroy completely whatever the guerrillas cannot carry
away or have no use for.
CHAPTER XII
THE CORRESPONDENCE NETWORK OF A GUERRILLA UNIT AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES IN THE REAR
1. THE OBJECT OF THE NETWORK.
So that they may be able to call upon one another for aid and receive information
at all times regarding the situation of the enemy, guerrilla units
should do their utmost to maintain the closest and most solid relations with
the local population for the exchange of correspondence.
2. MEANS FOR MAINTAINING RELATIONS.
In order to set up such a correspondence network, we should, in addition
to utilizing the telephone in the greatest possible measure, employ all means
at hand. These include runners, messengers on horseback, messengers on bicycles,
secret couriers posted in advance for transmitting information, as well as
transmittal by sentries, and even signals and pre-established signs, etc.
3. METHODS FOR TRANSMITTING REPORTS.
-
A network for important correspondence should be set up. Reports of an urgent
character can best be transmitted by messengers on horseback. When this is
impossible, we should send out reliable individuals particularly good at
going on foot. It is also possible to arrange in advance for the transmittal
of secret letters. There are times, too, when we must send out several men,
each of them taking a different route, to make certain that the report in
question will reach its destination. (This method should be limited to the
most important reports. )
-
As for ordinary reports that are not particularly important, they are commonly
transmitted by runners or messengers on bicycles. There are times when one
can also use faithful individuals from among the local population who are
thoroughly familiar with the routes to carry such reports.
4. SIGNALS FOR COMMUNICATIONS.
For the sake of convenience in guiding each guerrilla group or unit by day
or by night, in its actions in mountainous terrain or in forests, the commander
of a guerrilla unit should establish in advance a certain number of basic
signals and signs (such as signals fires at night, smoke signals by day,
coloured pennants, flags, semaphore signaling by flags, paper signals, whistles,
bugle calls, etc. ).
5. DISPOSITIONS REGARDING ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE REAR.
Should we or should we not destroy the routes of communication in the enemy's
rear? We must reflect in detail about this problem. If we conclude that,
in the future, our own army will not need to utilize these roads, or will
not be able to utilize them, then we can destroy them.
6. POINTS FOR ATTENTION IN DESTROYING ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION.
If we want to destroy routes of communication, we must be thoroughly familiar
with the terrain. It is only then that, moving rapidly and elusively, we
appear suddenly and quickly withdraw. In eliminating the enemy's sentries,
we must not fire a shot, in order not to alert them and give them a chance
to flee.
7. PRECAUTIONS WHEN BEGINNING THE DESTRUCTION OF ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION.
When we begin the destruction of routes of communication, we must first send
out a detachment to the place where the presence of the enemy has been reported,
in order to keep an eye on the enemy's patrols and his small detachments,
so that they cannot quickly and secretly get close to the point where our
own unit is at work. If, while beginning work, we are discovered by the enemy,
we should shoot at him to keep him from coming nearer.
8. METHODS OF DESTROYING WORKS ON THE GROUND.
-
Railroads should be destroyed at the points where they are most difficult
to repair, such as at curves, at points where the railway is hidden from
view, where the enemy's precautions are lax, where we can work under cover,
or where we can destroy a large length of track. When destroying the rails,
we should bend them, or hollow out the ground beneath them. In low-laying
places we should dig ditches. As for tunnels, we should obstruct them.
-
Railroad ties, wooden bridges, telegraph and telephone poles, etc., should
be burned up. Wires should be carried away or dropped into the water.
-
Signals switches, semaphores, railroad carriages, etc., located in the stations
should be destroyed, preferably by blowing them up with explosives.
-
In destroying cobblestone roads, highways, bridges, and other constructions,
we must in all cases choose a method of destruction appropriate to the nature
of the construction.
CHAPTER XIII
REGULAR HIDING PLACES AND PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN WE HALT
1. MARSHALING OUR TROOPS.
The problem is not merely one of resting and marshaling out troops. We require
a place that can also be used for conserving ammunition and food and for
receiving and looking after wounded and sick soldiers. Hence, the place in
question commonly serves also as a supporting point in time of battle. As
soon as we are the objects of the enemy's pursuit and attack, we withdraw
there, and secretly hide, so as to await an opportunity to act or to begin
resisting the enemy again.
2. THE CHOICE OF A SPOT.
-
A hiding place where we can rest for a long time may conveniently be found
deep in the forest, in a thatched hut near a marsh, in a cave under the ground
or in a mountainside, on a lonely farm, or in a small and secluded hamlet.
Because of the sympathy it enjoys a small guerrilla unit normally has no
difficulty at all in finding a regular hiding place.
-
A guerrilla unit must absolutely maintain the strictest secrecy regarding
the hiding places it has selected. Even one's closest friends and relatives
must not be informed if they have no connection with the guerrilla unit in
question. If our original hiding place has been discovered by the enemy,
then, in general, we should not wait for the enemy to come and attack us
but must quickly remove elsewhere.
-
Sometimes such hiding places also serve as storehouses for military equipment,
powder, and provisions, and also for receiving wounded and sick soldiers.
More often, a separate secret location in the vicinity of the hiding place
is selected for each type of storehouse because there are people continually
going in and out of a hiding place and it can very easily be discovered by
the enemy.
-
The more individuals there are among the people who support the guerrillas,
so that the guerrilla unit can also maintain a communications network among
the people, the easier it is for the guerrilla unit to find a hiding place.
There are times when, in order to evade the enemy's pursuit and attack, and
find a good place to hide, a given guerrilla unit must be split up, each
of its members being obliged to find a way to hide himself in one of the
houses of the local population. In such circumstances, the local population
is the only hope of salvation of the members of the guerrilla unit.
3. THE QUESTION OF PROVISIONS.
In places where the local population is hostile to the guerrillas, there
is no alternative to foraging backed by force, but one should send reliable
people from among the detachment, in order to guard against pillaging.
When the guerrilla unit does not fear discovery, it can send out a special
small unit to forage for food, to collect contributions of food, or to demand
food supplies from the local authorities.
4. CHANGING ONE'S HALTING PLACE.
The best method by which a guerrilla unit can maintain its own security is
through the agility of its action. In case of necessity, the unit can make
a habit of changing its halting place every night (if, during the day, it
has been in village A, at twilight it moves to village B).
5. OCCUPYING A HALTING PLACE.
When a guerrilla unit encamps, the arrangement of its forces should be determined
entirely by the nature of its action, but it should not occupy a large village
that its own forces are insufficient to hold. If a guerrilla unit cannot
do otherwise, and finds itself in such a place, it should occupy only a few
collective dwellings situated apart and convenient for defense. The best
thing is to be located in a village where one can keep a lookout in all
directions, especially on the road along which the enemy might come. We must
absolutely not disperse the members of the unit to stay in different houses,
acting, for the sake of individual convenience, in a way of which the enemy
could take advantage. In order to keep the enemy from knowing where we are
staying, the best method is to enter the village only late at night. Moreover,
we should look about carefully and all sides of the village and not allow
anyone at all to come out.
6. THE DEGREE OF PRECAUTIONS.
In order to avoid excessive fatigue to the members of a guerrilla unit, and
to assure them of a real rest, it is not necessary to send out large numbers
of scouts to sound a warning. It suffices to arrange for military outposts
and concealed scouts in all adjoining places and along all roads ( those
which the enemy must take, or those related to us ). We should also send
out spies to places from 2 to 4 li away. This distance will be sufficient.
Whether or not the enemy attacks us, we must always fix an assembly point
at a distance of from 10 to 16 li, for use in case of withdrawal.
Moreover, the roads leading to the assembly point should be designated and
marked in advance (but there must be at least two roads giving access to
such a place ) .
7. PREPARATIONS.
When a guerrilla unit is staying in a place, all its members, whether they
be officers or soldiers, must at all times take measures to prepare for battle.
Especially after twilight, every officer and soldier must gather together
the arms and other equipment he carries with him, and arrange them in proper
order, so that it will be convenient, in case there is an alarm in the dark,
for him to go out quickly and meet the attack.
8. WHEN THERE IS ANXIETY ABOUT A SURPRISE ATTACK BY THE ENEMY.
-
If the guerrilla unit itself is especially alert, if its intelligence network
is organized with exceptional discretion, and if the people of the area are
in sympathy with us, so that they regularly report all movements to us, then
it is extremely difficult for the enemy to mount sudden surprise attacks.
But whatever the circumstances may be, we must always exercise due caution.
-
In order to prevent the enemy relying on a hostile population from coming
and making a surprise attack on us, we must take special precautionary measures.
Thus by methods of intimidation we warn the local population, we arrest and
detain people. But at the same time, the unit must exercise caution and be
prepared.
-
If there is an alarm, we should assemble the whole unit in a building that
has been prepared for defense. We should dispatch to this building advance
sentries and observers as required. The entrance to the building should be
closed by movable obstacles, and we should establish in advance signals for
the defense. Weapons and other equipment should be properly prepared and
placed within reach of each man.
-
When circumstances are extremely critical, part of a friendly unit should
take over responsibility for the security of our position and the place in
which our army is staying, as well as for sending out spies far and wide
to add to the warning system. They report constantly to the guerrilla task
group on the situation of nearby enemy forces.
-
When we use artificial obstacles to block the roads, we must make provision
for communication with our first line and reserves, as well as with the local
population and our correspondence network.
-
In case of necessity, the roads within villages can be completely blocked
off, or we can leave a way through. Whenever possible, each guerrilla task
group should have a prepared position.
9. DISPOSITIONS IN CASE OF AN ENEMY SURPRISE ATTACK.
-
When we discover that the enemy is moving toward us, if we find out from
reconnaissance that he is not in strength, we should annihilate him with
one sudden blow. If the enemy forces are several times more numerous than
ours, we should rapidly withdraw. But while we are withdrawing we should
give the enemy a false impression of the direction in which we are moving,
so as to conceal our actual route of withdrawal.
-
If the enemy attacks us by surprise and we do not succeed in evading him,
we should exploit in full measure the advantages of a village for defensive
action, resist him firmly, and then later take advantage of an opportunity
to withdraw.
-
If we have already lost a village, we should reply by a counterattack or
counterblows in order to take it back quickly and save our captured comrades,
or those comrades who are clinging to a position and defending it stubbornly
to the death. If our action is rapid, we can always attain such objectives,
because after a victory the enemy is often in great confusion and lax in
his precautions.
-
The best occasion for carrying out such counterblows, or such a counteroffensive,
is just after the victory of the enemy's surprise attack. The sacrifices
of a charge under such circumstances are less than those from running away,
or from stopping and giving battle in unfavourable terrain following the
enemy' s attack.
CHAPTER XIV
TRAINING
1. THE SCOPE OF TRAINING.
Training is not limited to the military arts; we must also pay attention
to political training, to the literacy movement, to training in hygiene,
etc. Consequently, when a guerrilla unit is engaged in drill, literacy training
should represent an appropriate part of the whole, and can be given in all
places and at all times.
For the purpose of achieving a full and satisfactory result from all the
kinds of training carried out in a guerrilla unit, we must increase the will
to study on their own initiative among the officers and soldiers. Apart from
the political aspect, and in addition to increasing political consciousness,
we must also promote amusements for the army, mitigate a painful and tedious
existence, assist the people in their own self-defense, and cause the armed
force of the popular masses to unite closely with us.
2. TRAINING IN ALL SUBJECTS.
The consequence of training in all subjects, though it is difficult to reduce
it to uniformity, is, as regards methods in general, to proceed from the
superficial to the profound, first the broad and then the rigorous, from
the simple and easy to the complex and difficult, first the partial and then
the universal. In all fields, one must demonstrate one's theories by concrete
experience, so as to strengthen the students' confidence.
3. CULTIVATING THE PEOPLE'S CAPACITY FOR SELF-DEFENSE.
The most pressing and most important task of a guerrilla unit is to carry
out guerrilla attacks without ceasing in the places occupied by the enemy,
to seize and kill all traitors and reactionaries, and to protect the popular
masses. At the same time, a guerrilla unit must investigate the concrete
offenses of the enemy and use every possible method to discover and smash
his tricks and plots. Therefore:
-
It is advantageous to make known our good government, to make great efforts
to unite with the popular masses, and to support the forces of the popular
masses. Such actions can also be carried out on the territory of the enemy.
We should also use every possible method and devote all our strength to encourage
the people to imitate our own actions, stimulate them to fight the enemy
actively, and guide their combat.
-
Our action in supporting the people's capacity for self-defense should be
of long duration, and not ephemeral. We must do the best we can to let people
know that, at all times, a guerrilla unit struggles and sacrifices itself
for the popular masses and, even in the case of the most dangerous crisis,
will absolutely not harm the popular masses. If the local population meets
with a defeat in its first military action, after we have drawn it into the
war, its spirit of struggle will necessarily be dissipated to some extent.
When the masses falter in this way, we must devise a way to rouse their
enthusiasm and to bring their spirit of struggle to a high level once more.
-
A guerrilla unit constitutes the most conscious and advanced segment of the
people. Hence, they should first unite those among the popular masses who
are dissatisfied with the enemy and who accept the leadership of those we
send among them. We must also aid the people to establish plans, to get arms,
and to establish liaison and mutual assistance with mass organizations in
neighboring villages and even in other cities that are victims of the enemy's
oppression. But, in carrying out all such work, we must maintain the strictest
secrecy.
4. TRAINING IN HYGIENE.
-
In order to strengthen its own fighting capacity, every mess unit should
designate one or two soldiers as nurses, to treat the ailments of the officers
and soldiers when they arise and, also to explain the rudiments of hygiene,
as well as to assist, direct, supervise, and encourage all matters of hygiene
in the unit.
-
Replenishing stocks of medicines is an extremely difficult matter in a guerrilla
unit. Hence we should, in accordance with the seasons etc., prepare certain
medicines especially for emergency care, and other normally indispensable
medicines. As regards wounded and seriously ill members of the unit, when
there is no alternative, they are entrusted to fellow soldiers with some
slight medical knowledge or to local inhabitants sympathetic to us.
5. MILITARY TRAINING.
Military training all relates to the enemy army. Its purpose is to create
greater skill than that of the enemy in each specialized art.
-
Subjects. The items requiring particular attention are dispersing, assembling,
marksmanship, maneuvering an army, mountain climbing, construction of military
works, night fighting, mountain fighting, fighting on narrow roads, espionage
and security measures, searches, liaison, and other such actions.
-
Methods. In carrying out military instruction, particular attention should
be paid to all methods of teaching and explanation, which should be more
or less as described below:
-
For theoretical instruction one can employ the method of giving suggestions
and the method of questions and answers. All methods of teaching that adopt
the style of speechmaking and injecting [ideas into the students' heads]
should be eliminated in so far as possible.
-
When explaining actions, we should pay attention to linking our talks with
the living reality, so that it will be easy for the soldiers to understand
us.
-
We should devote more time to concrete demonstrations of actions and less
time to talking about empty theories. Consequently, the greatest effort should
be made to diminish the duration and number of classroom sessions and the
numbers of practical exercises should be increased.
-
All explanations in the classroom should in so far as possible correspond
to the exercises outside.
-
All demonstrations of actions should be carefully prepared in advance before
they are executed. All negligent and perfunctory behaviourdoing things
any old waymust absolutely be eliminated.
-
With respect to all activities, we should devise a way to incite the officers
and soldiers to carry out a competition, in order to increase the spirit
of initiative and the positive attitude they manifest in their work, and
to speed up the work.
-
Increase applied training, diminish training according to a fixed pattern,
and correct the erroneous idea that training according to a fixed pattern
is useful in maintaining military discipline.
-
The plan of training should be suited to the circumstances, time, and place
in which it is to be carried out. The training plan must absolutely not be
rigid; we must seize every occasion and strive to give training adapted to
the circumstances. This is done more or less as indicated below:
-
We utilize the time when the army is on the march to carry on direction finding,
recognizing differences in terrain, estimating distances, reconnaissance
action, and designating objectives and the utilization of terrain.
-
When we are in camp, we utilize preparations for security measures in order
to carry out exercises in all kinds of observation and precautions, beginning
with the role of advanced sentries. We also provide training in construction
of military works.
-
We utilize the opportunity provided by a battle, and before setting out or
before the fighting begins, we explain, on the basis of the tasks we have
been ordered to perform, such forms of action as ambushes, surprise attacks,
main attacks, and supporting attacks, etc.
-
We utilize the opportunity, when we are awaiting the moment for action, to
explain in practical terms how we resist the charges of the enemy, as well
as shooting and other such military actions.
-
We utilize post-battle exposition and criticism (such exposition and criticism
should be based on a minute investigation of the facts, carried out beforehand)
to point out the strength and weaknesses in our actions during the battle
and what was appropriate and inappropriate in the individual commands, thus
giving a concrete lesson to all of officers and men.
-
We utilize the time offered by morning and evening roll calls to give various
kinds of talks.
-
We utilize the occasion offered by the recreation period to put on games,
dances, and modern-style plays, having military significance, thus imperceptibly
increasing the officers' and soldiers' desire to correct themselves, and
increasing their willingness to follow good examples.
-
We utilize each occasion of reward and punishment to carry out thorough
propaganda among the officers and soldiers, in order to increase the soldiers'
sense of achievement and their shame in doing evil, and thus, little by little,
fostering a good military discipline.
6. POLITICAL TRAINING.
In order to assure that all the independent actions of a guerrilla unit attain
complete victory, apart from reinforcing military training, the most important
thing is that we must make certain that the officers and soldiers have a
high level of "political consciousness" and of "devotion" to their own cause.
Political training is the only method by which this objective can be attained.
Its content is described in detail later on.
7. THE LITERACY MOVEMENT.
In order to increase the cultural level of the officers and soldiers, so
that they may more easily absorb all kinds of training, each mess unit must
carry out literacy training. The methods are as follows:
-
The "A" class includes all those who know about fifty characters.
-
The "B" class includes those who know above twenty characters.
-
The "C" class includes those who know no characters at all.
-
The teachers of the various classes consist of those in the unit with a
relatively high cultural level.
-
When we halt, there should be an hour each day devoted to the study of
characters. When we are on the march, we can carry out instruction either
while moving or during rest periods. In such training, the important thing
is regularity rather than speed. In general, if the soldiers learn two words
a day, it is excellent.
CHAPTER XV
POLITICAL WORK
1. THE AIM OF THE POLITICAL WORK OF A GUERRILLA UNIT.
This aim lies in strengthening and raising to a higher level the fighting
capacity of each member of the unit. The fighting capacity of a guerrilla
unit is not determined exclusively by military arts, but depends above all
on political consciousness, political influence, setting in motion the broad
popular masses, disintegrating the enemy army, and inducing the broad popular
masses to accept our leadership. All the plans of a guerrilla unit, whether
they be political. military, or of any other nature, are all directed toward
this single end.
2. THE MAIN CONTENT OF POLITICAL WORK.
We must carry out political instruction directed toward the resurrection
of our people (stimulate the soldiers' national consciousness, their patriotism,
and their love for the people and for the masses) and see to it that every
officer and soldier in a guerrilla unit understands not only the national
tasks for which he is responsible but also the necessity of fighting in defense
of our state.
We must also pay attention to supporting the leaders, to maintaining the
solidarity of the unit with real sincerity, to carrying out to the end the
orders of one's superiors, and to maintaining an iron military discipline.
We must see to it that the multitude of the soldiers are of a single mind
and endowed with the resolve and the will to save our country together.
Apart from strengthening its own fighting capacity, a guerrilla unit must
also carry out propaganda among the masses regarding the plots of the invaders
and of the enemy.
3. DISCUSSIONS IN SMALL GROUPS.
These are excellent activities to unite our walls, to strengthen confidence,
and to proclaim our doctrine.
-
We collect the view of all the comrades, in order to avoid feelings of alienation
and to achieve the effect of gathering together ideas and obtaining greater
advantage.
-
By the cadres, we increase their capacity for work and give them more practice
in techniques for holding meetings and in methods of speaking. We will also
be able to solve problems more quickly, investigate the past, and transform
the future.
-
We can thus verify the fellowship existing among the members of the unit,
and draw new comrades into the party.
-
This method is convenient for training, and makes it possible to understand
completely each comrade's circumstances, capacity, and knowledge.
-
According to their character, these activities can be divided into discussion
meetings, review meetings, and criticism meetings.
4. METHODS
Before the meeting we must prepare for it. These preparations consist in
informing the members of the group, establishing the essential subject matter
of the discussion, and, at the same time, reporting to the next higher echelon.
-
As regards the number of participants, from three to five represents the
optimum.
-
One should not be bound by any rigid pattern. Discussion meetings can be
held at all times and in all places.
-
As for the time limit, it is not desirable that the meetings should last
too long. One hour is the maximum permissible.
-
It is appropriate to hold one meeting a week. The order of procedure consists
in a report by the chairman, discussion of the report by the participants,
and a conclusion entrusted to the leader of the group. The record of the
meeting should indicate in detail the name of the chairman, the subjects
of discussion, the number of those present and absent, and the place where
the meeting was held.
-
Not more than two problems at most should be discussed. The discussion should
have as its starting point the individual problems of the participants.
-
As for the manner of speaking, it is appropriate that the remarks of the
participants should deal with essentials and be simple and clear. They should
be systematic and not repetitive. They should be persuasive in content and
presented in a friendly and agreeable manner. In answering questions, one
should avoid any hint of mockery and pay attention to what the others say.
At the same time, one should arrive at a decision concerning the topic discussed.
-
As regards the leader of the group, his report should be simple. He should
not give a long and repetitive presentation but seize the occasion to induce
the participants to speak.
-
The conclusion should follow the inductive method. It should include a criticism
of the whole of the discussions. If there are dissident conclusions, they
may also be expressed
5. CARRYING OUT POLITICAL WORK.
One should not merely rely on a few political workers. The best thing is
to be able to attract and train conscious elements, or interested officers
and soldiers, to participate in the work and to train the whole personnel
of the unit so that they can all carry on effective political work.
6. TYPES OF POLITICAL WORK.
In broad terms, political work can be divided into three categories according
to whether it is carried out in ordinary times, during battle, or after a
battle. As for propaganda destined to encourage the troops, the various aspects
are as indicated below:
-
Political work in ordinary times. We intensify political training in order
to raise the level of political consciousness, create unity in thought, word,
and deed, maintain an iron military discipline, and unite closely with the
popular masses. The methods are roughly as follows:
-
We must really put into practice the principles of not disturbing or harming
the people (such as "Pay fairly for what you buy," "Speak politely," "Return
everything you borrow", and "Pay for anything you damage" ).
-
At all times and in all places, aid the popular masses and help them to solve
their difficulties (for example, help the popular masses to gather the harvest
or to cultivate their land and send our army doctors to prevent epidemics
or treat the people's ailments, or to enquire after people who have suffered
difficulties and devise methods to aid them), maintain the unity of the army
and the people, and encourage the spirit of sharing both good fortune and
adversity together.
-
Chat frequently with the popular masses and let them know about our military
discipline and our affection for them, and also learn in detail about the
hunger and suffering among the people.
-
Frequently hold joint entertainment sessions for the soldiers and the people,
so as to smooth over any feelings of alienation between the army and the
people and increase the affection of the army and the people for one another.
-
Resolving any feelings of alienation between the lower and higher ranks of
officers and soldiers. The methods employed are roughly as follows:
-
Persons engaged in political training, apart from sharing the good fortune
and adversity of the soldiers, should also frequently chat with the soldiers,
carefully investigate all their deep grieves and report their problems at
all times to their superior officers, and devise methods for improving the
situation.
-
As regards all the opinions of higher and lower ranks, we should take our
stand on a position of pure rational knowledge, convince them by an attitude
of sincere entreaty, and explain things to them. We must make absolutely
certain that higher and lower ranks unite solidly as one man, and we must
strengthen their capacity to unite.
-
With respect to soldiers who violate discipline, we should use educational
methods to persuade them. All corporal punishment and insults must absolutely
be reduced.
-
We should frequently hold meetings at which officers and soldiers can enjoy
themselves together, in order to heighten the affection between officers
and soldiers.
-
Augmenting the officers' and soldiers' hatred of the enemy, and increasing
their resolve to fight to the death to kill the enemy. Increasing the common
hatred of the enemy is an important factor in strengthening the soldiers'
morale. Consequently, a guerrilla unit should pay particular attention to
all the atrocities of the enemy, and to all the instances in which he massacres
our army or our people, and carry out propaganda generally among the army
regarding these atrocities, so as to heighten the courage of the officers
and soldiers to fight to the death and harden their resolve to fight the
enemy to the death, since either we or they must perish.
-
Strengthening confidence in the inevitable victory of our war against the
enemy. The methods are more or less as follows:
-
We must frequently avail ourselves of the tales of the glorious feats of
arms in our past, in order to carry out propaganda among our officers and
soldiers and inspire them.
-
We put forward examples of the enemy's defects (such as difficulties, collapses,
and other problems that he has recently encountered), in order to demonstrate
that in the end the enemy must be defeated.
-
We must put forward examples of our own strong points (such as the support
of the popular masses, transmission of information, familiarity with the
terrain) and the present victorious circumstances, in order to demonstrate
that we must ultimately triumph.
-
By exposing the clever tricks habitually used by the enemy, we make known
the points to which our army should pay particular attention, in order to
prevent the emergence of a mentality of fearing or underestimating the enemy.
After we have suffered an attack, we sink for a time into a situation
characterized by difficulties and painful effort, and as a consequence we
underestimate ourselves, exaggerate the enemy's strength, and lose our confidence
in victory.
7. POLITICAL WORK IN TIME OF BATTLE.
Political work before we set out is carried on as described below.
-
The commander in chief of the unit first calls a meeting of the cadres. He
explains in what respects the existing political situation is favorable to
us, as well as the conditions of victory and the significance of the battle.
He also explains the methods and points for attention in attaining our goal,
but without infringing military secrecy.
-
On the basis of the meeting of the cadres, the political training section
immediately calls meetings of political workers at all levels, at which the
essential points and the methods of propaganda are explained and concrete
tasks are assigned.
-
The various groups immediately call meetings of all the officers and soldiers,
at which, in addition to reporting on the current political situation and
the guarantees of our victory, conditions for competition are also put forward.
("He who is lightly wounded should not leave the firing line, he who is seriously
wounded should not cry out in pain"; "Let us see who can hand in the most
weapons"; or "Let us see who can take the most prisoners,") At the same time,
tasks are distributed to all political workers and activists (supervision,
leadership, or propaganda ).
-
Political workers should be sent to the local population to gather them together,
call meetings, and give talks, inspiring them to participate in the battle
or to join the ranks of the porters or the transport units. As regards the
organizations of the popular masses, we should guide them in methods of calling
meetings, of fighting, and of preparing mobilization.
-
After the battle has begun, the most important political training workers
should be sent to inspire the units responsible for the main attack or for
particularly important actions. The less important political training workers
should be sent to inspire the less important fighting units.
-
Propaganda units and groups of singers and dancers (all composed of lively
and lovable boys in uniform and attractive clothing) should be sent in advance
to positions along the side of the roads where the army will advance, to
give short talks, sing, dance, or shout slogans, so as to inspire the maximum
of courage in the officers and soldiers.
8. POLITICAL WORK AFTER THE BATTLE HAS BEGUN.
-
After the battle has begun, we should pay attention to calling out slogans
to the soldiers of the other side, so as to dissipate their morale. This
is one of the forms taken by our work of sabotage.
-
When the situation on the battlefield enters the stage of an encounter at
close range or from positions arrayed opposite one another, we devise a method
for holding a joint meeting with the soldiers of the opposite side and take
advantage of this opportunity to give them food, in order to gladden their
hearts. After this, we carry on more propaganda work, which must be prepared
in advance.
-
After the battle has begun, we must assuredly carry out propaganda directed
toward those outside our army. It is even more important to inspire those
within our army. The methods for this work are diverse and are determined
primarily by what is adapted to the circumstances. For example:
-
On the attack:
-
When we suffer a surprise attack by the enemy while advancing to attack,
we should give an explanation such as the following "Comrades! Airplanes
cannot decide a battle. We must seize this opportunity, advance rapidly,
and quickly come to grips with the enemy on the ground. Charge the enemy
with your bayonets!"
-
When firing begins, we should encourage the soldiers in the following terms:
"Comrades! Don't shoot at random, shoot only when you have taken careful
aim. We must try to kill an enemy with every bullet."
-
When we are near the enemy and are about to charge, the method for inspiring
the soldiers is as follows:
"Comrades! The time to dispose of the enemy has come. We shall pay no attention
to sacrifice, we shall summon up our courage, defeat the enemy and annihilate
him. Let our victory inspire the whole army! Forward quickly! Charge!"
-
When the first charge is repelled and we charge a second time, we should
encourage the soldiers as follows: "Comrades! We are an invincible iron army,
we are a mighty unit victorious in every battle, we are absolutely resolved
to destroy this enemy and preserve our glorious reputation."
-
When officers are wounded or killed in battle, we should exhort the troops
as follows: "Comrades! Our officers (So-and-so) and (So-and-so) have already
sacrificed themselves gloriously. Let us tread in their bloody footsteps,
complete their task, and annihilate the enemy before us. Let us go and avenge
them!"
-
If the enemy shows signs of wavering, we should exhort the soldiers as follows:
"Comrades! The enemy is wavering. Charge quickly and capture his commander
in chief alive!"
-
When we pursue the enemy, we should exhort the soldiers as follows: "Comrades!
The enemy has retreated. Pursue him quickly! Charge and smash the enemy's
holding units, finish off his main force, annihilate his whole force. Let
us see who can hand in the most arms, and who can take the most prisoners.
To win a battle and not to pursue the enemy is a great pity."
-
On the defence:
-
When the order has been received, we should carry out propaganda as follows:
"Comrades! The enemy has arrived. This is the best opportunity to annihilate
the enemy. Make skillful use of natural obstacles, and shoot with
sang-froid. The more of the enemy we kill and wound, the easier it
will be for our main attack to progress and obtain results."
-
When the enemy charges, we should exhort the troops as follows: "Comrades!
The enemy is about to charge. Fix your bayonets, and prepare your hand grenades.
Let us summon up our awe-inspiring reputation, preserve the glory we have
already won, and annihilate the enemy in front of our position."
-
When we are surrounded by the enemy, we should exhort the soldiers as follows:
"Comrades! We are an ever-victorious unit. We are a courageous and invincible
iron army. We will wage a bloody battle to the end for our people and our
country, shed our last drop of blood, hold onto our rifles to the death,
and die rather than surrender. To hand over one's rifle is suicide, to surrender
is the supreme shame. Let us smash their lines at one point and break through."
-
At the time of the counterattack or when the order to go over to the offensive
is received: "Comrades! We are counterattacking. Let us take away the enemy's
rifles, let us capture the enemy officers, let us see who is most courageous!"
-
Propaganda when we retreat: "Comrades! Let us keep our movements secret and
baffle the enemy in his calculations. Let us open wide our arms and lure
the enemy to penetrate deep. Do not break ranks, do not fall behind, do not
waver, do not succumb to panic, do not fear sacrifice, execute resolutely
to the end the orders of your superiors. Final victory will be ours!"
-
When we cover the withdrawal of our forces, the methods for exhorting them
are similar to those indicated above.
9. POLITICAL WORK FOLLOWING A BATTLE.
After the battle has been concluded, political work continues.
-
In order to avoid the appearance of attitudes of slighting the enemy or fearing
the enemy, we should pay attention to the following points:
-
We should correctly point out the causes of victory and defeat. We must not
become puffed up because of a small victory; still less can we lose our
confidence in victory because of a small setback.
-
We must establish the attitude that should be adopted henceforth, or the
points requiring attention.
-
We should collect materials and anecdotes concerning our victory, as well
as the names of units, individual officers, and soldiers who have fought
courageously. We should then use these materials to compose propaganda outlines,
songs, dances, old- and new-style plays, etc.
-
We should print large numbers of victory announcements and slogans and stick
them up everywhere. At the same time, we should organize a roving propaganda
unit, which spreads out toward areas established in advance, to carry out
propaganda and to call the popular masses together and hold meetings to celebrate
the victory.
-
When meetings are held to celebrate the victory, one should pay attention
to the following points:
-
Report on the significance of the victory, and the tasks now before us, as
well as the concrete methods to be employed to carry out these tasks.
-
Report on units that have fought courageously, as well as individual officers
and soldiers. As for officers and soldiers wounded or killed, one can select
the most valuable among them and report about them.
-
Put on new versions of classic plays, as well as songs and dances.
While the reports indicated under a and b above are being delivered, or the
play is being put on, the units participating in such a meeting should shout
out slogans in accompaniment. We should also bring up the methods for providing
pensions to the members of the families of the soldiers killed in battle.
Moreover, we should bring together the prisoners and booty in the sight of
the masses, thus further increasing the courage and the spirit of struggle
of our soldiers and of the people.
-
At meetings to celebrate the victory, all organizations should also launch
a consolation movement. The main points for attention in this respect are:
-
As regards material consolation, the important thing is not the quantity,
but the significance; it is not the elegance and refinement of the items
given, but their utility. Such things as straw sandals, face towels, pigs,
sheep, chickens, and ducks are all suitable for this purpose.
-
In case there is a lack of goods for material consolation, consolation in
the form of honors should be used. For example, one can make flags for
presentation, or compose songs in memory of the fallen, or issue an order
of the day in their praise.
-
Following a small victory, there should be no large-scale consolation.
Consolation should be carried out only if we can devise means for doing it
in a place near the battlefield.
-
We should praise examples of combined operations, autonomous actions, and
the resolute application of orders. Thus:
-
When there are those who, in the course of a fierce battle, have achieved
victory by combined operations, autonomous action, and the resolute execution
of orders, the maximum effort should be made to publicize the fact and to
praise them. Those who have the misfortune to be defeated in similar
circumstances should also be praised.
-
When there is punishment for those who, in order to preserve their own forces,
fail to advance, or fail to carry out their tasks energetically, thus bringing
about the defeat of another unit of our army, the case should also be the
object of large-scale propaganda within the unit. In this way we give a lesson
to the officers and soldiers of the whole unit, or of other units, and make
them afraid to commit similar offenses.
10. WORK PERTAINING TO CLUBS AND AMUSEMENT ROOMS.
By virtue of the fact that it compensates for a painful and tedious existence
in the army, this is also a way of preventing desertion. The essentials regarding
the organization and work of clubs are dealt with below.
-
Rules regarding organization.
-
In order to promote entertainment in the army, compensate for a tedious
existence, increase interest in our work, and inspire a taste for study,
each mess unit within a guerrilla unit should organize an amusement room,
This should be divided into a military section, a guerrilla section, and
a physical culture section. Each officer and soldier in the mess unit should
choose one of these sections, in accordance with his own nature; he can,
if he wishes, participate in two or three of the sections.
-
One person from among the company commanders or the particularly energetic
and capable platoon commanders should be chosen to be responsible for the
amusement room. Each of the three sections should have a section head, chosen
at a meeting of the members of the section, for a period of six months with
the possibility of being chosen to succeed himself .
-
Each week there should be one meeting of the section heads and one meeting
of the members of each section. A meeting of the leaders should be held once
a month. It is called separately by the chairman of the section heads.
-
In its work, the amusement room should follow the guidance of the club of
the next higher echelon. It is also subject to the supervision and guidance
of the commanding officer of the unit. In military affairs, it is absolutely
subordinate to the commanding officer of the unit.
-
In order to guide and unify the work of the various amusement rooms, a guerrilla
battalion should establish a club. This club should have a chairman and a
secretary who are responsible for all its activities.
-
The club should be attached to the political training section, because the
work of the amusement rooms constitutes a kind of political training. If
there is no political training section, the club is directly subordinated
to the commanding of officer.
-
The work of the club consists in guiding and promoting the work of the various
amusement rooms. Consequently, each week there should be a meeting of the
responsible heads of the various amusement rooms, and each month we should
call a meeting of all the officers and soldiers or a meeting of the army
and the people together.
All the work of both the clubs and amusement rooms should have as its principle
not to interfere with military administration, military training, or military
action.
-
The essentials of the work of clubs and amusement rooms.
-
The work of the military section consists in furthering a spirit of independent
study among the officers and soldiers, in discussion of military questions,
or in the mutual rectification of the actions of the members in order to
remedy the lacks and insufficiencies of military training. Its content is
as indicated below.
-
Bayonet section (practice, taking a hypothetical enemy dummy as the object).
-
Grenade section (throwing a wooden hand grenade at a target).
-
Guerrilla section.
-
Taking aim from a fixed support.
-
Checking one's aim.
-
Carriage while shooting.
-
Investigations when setting out.
-
Utilization of obstacles.
-
Shooting at various types of objectives in the field.
-
Physical culture section. The work of this section lies in strengthening
the bodies of the officers and soldiers. It can also remedy insufficiencies
in military training. Its contents is as follows:
-
Ball playing (basketball, football, volley ball, tennis, baseball, etc.).
-
Track and field sports (high jump, broad jump, races, obstacle course ).
-
Boxing and swordplay.
-
Entertainment section. The work of this section consists in providing amusement
for the members of the army, in compensating for a tedious existence, and
in increasing the soldiers' interest in their work and their taste for study.
-
Joke section. This section can carry on its activities at any time at all,
but attention should be paid to the following points:
-
When jokes are told, we must make them easy to understand. We can take materials
from joke books and such, but they should not be too obscene.
-
When telling stories, we should devote much time to stories about the abundant
exploits and great enterprises of the ancients, and to their excellent words
and admirable conduct, in order to achieve an inspirational effect.
-
When reporting on the news, we should devote attention to our own victories
and to the atrocities of the enemy.
-
Theatrical section. This section utilizes rest periods, both in the evenings
and during the day, to put on all sorts of new-style plays, traditional operas,
comedy teams, storytellers with drums, etc.performances that have political
content and are at the same time amusing, in order to improve morale.
-
Song and dance section. In accordance with the circumstances in which the
unit finds itself and the nature of its tasks, this section composes all
sorts of songs in order to stimulate the interest of the officers and soldiers
in singing songs, or it puts on dances in costume, assuming various comical
attitudes, in order to make the onlookers laugh until they hold their sides.
-
Music section. This is divided into violin, harmonica, guitar and other groups,
which can accompany the plays and dances.
-
The methods of work of all sections should be adapted to the time and
circumstances. They should be employed in a lively manner, and on no account
in a wooden fashion.
-
The work of all sections should be subject to strict control and supervision.
We should also use methods of competition to induce all the officers and
soldiers to make spontaneous efforts.
-
All kinds of songs and old and new plays, etc.
-
For the benefit of the work, all groups and sections should have specialized
talents.
-
The officers and soldiers who participate in these performances should be
excused from their other duties.
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